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AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 80A(C)(ii) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT NO. 58 
OF 1962 AS AMENDED 
 
In November 2006 section 103(1) of the Act was abolished and replaced by a 
new Part IIA, containing sections 80A to 80L, which targets impermissible tax 
avoidance arrangements.  Section 80A(c)(ii) introduced a new concept to the 
South African tax law: a misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act, 
including Part IIA thereof. 
 
The objective of this study was to establish the origin, meaning, application 
and effect of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  The evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) 
was therefore examined where after the enacted version was analyzed.  It 
was essential to determine the origin of section 80A(c)(ii) in order to establish 
some point of reference from which inferences could be drawn as to the 
possible application and effect thereof.  Case law, practice statements and 
articles relating to its proposed root was then examined. 
 
A ‘misuse or abuse’ of a provision, it was found, implies, frustrating or 
exploiting the purpose of the provision.  This contention was confirmed by 
existing Canadian precedent.  Such an interpretation, however, has a strong 
resemblance to the words in which the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) was 
couched.  It is therefore in contrast to the presumption that different words (in 
the enacted version) imply a different meaning.  The precise meaning of the 
words ‘misuse or abuse’ is thus still elusive. 
 
It was established that section 80A(c)(ii) has its roots in section 245 of the 
Canadian Act.  Section 245(4) was regarded as an effective comparative to 
section 80A(c)(ii) as it also contained a so-called misuse or abuse rule.  The 
application of this rule in the Canadian tax environment required the following 
process: 
 
 iv
- Interpret (contextually and purposively) the provisions relied on by the 
taxpayer, to determine their object, spirit and purpose. 
 
- Determine whether the transaction frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or 
purpose of the provisions. 
 
Section 245(4) had the effect of reviving the modern approach (a contextual 
and/or purposive theory) to the interpretation of statutes in Canada.  
Reference to the ‘spirit’ of a provision (above) was found not to extend the 
modern approach to statutory interpretation: it does not require of the court to 
look for some inner and spiritual meaning within the legislation.  As section 
245(4) was regarded as an effective comparative to section 80A(c)(ii) it was 
contented that it would have a similar effect, than that of its Canadian 
counterpart, on the approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa. 
 
However, it was established that a modern approach to statutory 
interpretation was already authoritative in South Africa.  This finding led the 
author to the conclusion that section 80A(c)(ii) could at best only reinforce the 
case for applying such an approach.  Such a purpose for section 80A(c)(ii) 
was however found to be void in the light of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, which was enacted in 1996, and provides a sovereign authority 
for the application of the modern approach. 
 
It was also found that the practical burden of showing that there was a 
‘misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act (including the provisions of this 
Part)’ will rest on the shoulders of the Commissioner, notwithstanding section 
82 of the Act.
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‘N ANALISE VAN ARTIKEL 80A(C)(ii) VAN DIE 
INKOMSTEBELASTINGWET NO. 58 VAN 1962 SOOS GEWYSIG 
 
Artikel 103(1) van die Inkomstebelastingwet is herroep in November 2006 en 
vervang deur Deel IIA, bestaande uit artikels 80A tot 80L, wat daarop gemik is 
om ontoelaatbare belastingvermydingsreëlings te teiken.  Artikel 80A(c)(ii) het 
‘n nuwe konsep in die Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstebelastingreg ingebring: ‘n 
misbruik of ‘n wangebruik van die bepalings van die Wet, insluitende Deel IIA. 
 
Die doel van hierdie studie was om die oorsprong, betekenis, toepassing en 
uitwerking van artikel 80A(c)(ii) vas te stel.  Die ontwikkeling van artikel 
80A(c)(ii) is daarom ondersoek waarna die verordende weergawe daarvan 
geanaliseer is.  ‘n Sleutelaspek van die analise was om die oorsprong van 
artikel 80A(c)(ii) vas te stel.  Hierdie oefening het ‘n verwysbare bron 
daargestel waarvan afleidings rondom die moontlike toepassing en uitwerking 
van artikel 80A(c)(ii) gemaak kon word.  Hofsake, praktyknotas en artikels 
rakende die voorgestelde oorsprong is vervolgens ondersoek.    
  
Daar is vasgestel dat ‘n ‘misbruik of wangebruik’ van ‘n bepaling neerkom op 
die frustering of uitbuiting van die doel van ‘n bepaling.  Hierdie bewering is 
bevestig deur bestaande Kanadese presedent.  So ‘n interpretasie is egter 
soortgelyk aan die woorde waarin die konsepweergawe van artikel 80A(c)(ii) 
uitgedruk is.  Dit is daarom in teenstelling met die vermoede dat ‘n wysiging 
van die woorde (in die verordende weergawe) ‘n gewysigde betekenis 
impliseer.  Die presiese betekenis van die woorde ‘misbruik of wangebruik’ is 
dus steeds ontwykend. 
   
Daar is bevind dat artikel 80A(c)(ii) waarskynlik sy ontstaan in artikel 245 van 
die Kanadese Inkomstebelastingwet gehad het.  Artikel 245(4) van die 
Kanadese Inkomstebelastingwet is beskou as ‘n effektiewe vergelykende 
artikel vir artikel 80A(c)(ii), aangesien dit ook oor ‘n sogenaamde misbruik of 
wangebruik reël beskik.  Die toepassing van hierdie reël in die Kanadese 
belastingmilieu vereis die volgende werkswyse: 
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- Interpreteer (kontekstueel en doeldienend) die bepalings waarop die 
belastingpligtige steun, ten einde die oogmerk, gees en doel daarvan vas 
te stel. 
 
- Bepaal of die transaksie, deur die belastingpligtige aangegaan, die 
oogmerk, gees of doel van die bepalings frustreer.  
 
Artikel 245(4) het aanleiding gegee tot die herstel van die moderne 
benadering (‘n kontekstuele en/of doeldienende teorie) tot die interpretasie 
van wetgewing in Kanada.  Daar is bevind dat die verwysing na die ‘gees’ van 
‘n bepaling (hierbo) nie aanleiding gee tot die uitbreiding van die moderne 
benadering tot wetsuitleg nie: dit vereis nie dat die hof moet soek na die 
innerlike of geestelike betekenis van die wetgewing nie.  Aangesien artikel 
245(4) as ‘n effektiewe vergelykende artikel vir artikel 80A(c)(ii) beskou is, is 
daar aangeneem dat dit ‘n soortgelyke uitwerking, as sy Kanadese eweknie, 
op wetsuitleg in Suid Afrika sal hê. 
 
By nadere ondersoek is daar egter bevind dat ‘n moderne benadering tot 
wetsuitleg alreeds gesaghebbend in Suid Afrika is.  Hierdie bevinding het die 
skrywer tot die gevolgtrekking gebring dat artikel 80A(c)(ii), in beginsel, slegs 
die saak vir die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg in Suid Afrika sal versterk.  
Indien hierdie die doel is wat die wetgewer gehad het met die verordening van 
artikel 80A(c)(ii), sal dit egter niksseggend wees in die lig van die Grondwet 
van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, wat verorden is in 1996, en ‘n 
oppermagtige gesag bied vir die moderne benadering tot wetsuitleg. 
 
Daar is ook vasgestel dat die onus op die Kommissaris rus om te bewys dat 
daar ‘n ‘misbruik of wangebruik van die bepalings van hierdie Wet (waarby 
ingesluit die bepalings van hierdie Deel)’ was, ondanks artikel 82 van die Wet. 
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abuse South Africa’s tax provisions in ways clearly unintended by the 
legislature.  They will be vigorously challenged.’ ~ Pravin Gordhan, SARS 
Commissioner.1  
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  Thersby 2007 
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1.1  Background and problem statement 
 
In November 2006 section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, as 
amended, (the Act) was repealed.  A new Part IIA was inserted into the Act by 
section 36(1)(a) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act, 2006.  Part IIA 
contains sections 80A to 80L2 which targets impermissible tax avoidance 
arrangements and will apply to any arrangement (including all steps therein or 
parts thereof) entered into on or after 2 November 2006.   
 
Part IIA attempts to draw a line between permissible and impermissible (or 
abusive) tax avoidance.  Section 80A of the Act contains four requirements in 
order to determine whether an arrangement is an impermissible tax avoidance 
arrangement or not.  In short, the four requirements are: 
 
1.   An avoidance arrangement (as defined) is entered into or carried 
out; 
 
2. It results in a tax benefit (as defined); 
 
3.   Any one of the following ‘tainted elements’ are present:  
 
 -   Abnormality regarding means, manner, rights or obligations; 
 -   Lack of commercial substance (as defined) in whole or in part; 
 -   Misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act (including Part IIA); 
 
4.   The sole or main purpose is to obtain a tax benefit. 
  
The misuse or abuse requirement3 is contained in section 80A(c)(ii).  The 
concept of a misuse or abuse of any provision of the Act, has not been 
                                                 
2
  Sections 80A to 80L of the Act are collectively referred to as the general anti-avoidance 
rule in South Africa. 
3
  This will also be referred to as the misuse or abuse concept. 
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developed in the Act at all.  In addition, the words ‘misuse’ or ‘abuse’ do not 
appear with great frequency in our law reports; at least, not when used 
uniformly in any very specific technical sense.4  Broomberg is of opinion that 
section 80A(c)(ii) introduces a principle that relates more aptly to the law 
prevailing in foreign jurisdictions, presumably Canada.5  According to 
Mazansky this is an area that will have to be developed by the courts over 
time, though it is likely to be quite a few years before the first decision is 
handed down.6   
 
The following observations, with regards to section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, have 
been made by tax scholars in South Africa: 
 
- ‘The South African ‘misuse or abuse’ provision finds its origin 
(apparently) in the provisions of the Canadian GAAR.’ (Emphasis 
added.)7 
 
- ‘At any rate, this kind of legislative ‘borrowing’ from foreign jurisdictions 
creates a further layer of uncertainty about the meaning of section 
80A(c)(ii).’8 
 
- ‘Whatever the reason for its introduction, the important question remains: 
What does the phrase ‘misuse or abuse’ mean in the context of section 
80A(c)(ii)?’9 
 
- ‘Firstly, it could be regarded as, effectively, a codification of the common-
law position.  In my view this would make it a dead letter, a provision 
without real effect.  Secondly, in terms of the alternative approach, its 
effect would appear to be radically different and, to say the least, 
                                                 
4
  Cilliers 2008a:86 
5
  Broomberg 2007:3 
6
  Mazansky 2007:162 
7
  Clegg 2007:37 
8
  Cilliers 2008b:107 
9
  Cilliers 2008a:86 
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incredibly far-reaching: If the provision is seen as somehow adding 
something to the common law ... it appears as if the inevitable 
conclusion is that it would effectively outlaw virtually all attempts at tax 
avoidance.’10 
 
- ‘Even then, if the other tests do not hit the transaction, it is submitted that 
the ‘misuse or abuse’ test will have no practical effect other than to raise 
the question as to why the legislature chose to insert it.’11 
 
- ‘It seems to me that the wording of s80A(c)(ii) creates an unreasonably 
high level of uncertainty.  The problem is simply that it is almost 
impossible to say with any degree of certainty what section 80A(c)(ii) 
means, even in principle.’12 
 
Based on the above cited observations, it is submitted that section 80A(c)(ii) 
of the Act is an ambiguous provision.  Uncertainty prevails as to its origin, 
meaning, application and effect in South Africa. 
 
1.2  Objective 
 
The objective of this study is to examine section 80A(c)(ii) in isolation, that is, 
without considering any of the other requirements necessary for the 
application of Part IIA, in order to determine its origin, meaning, application 
and effect in South Africa.  In accomplishing this object consideration will be 
given to the following: 
 
- The history and evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act in South Africa. 
- The meaning of the words used in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
- The origin of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
                                                 
10
  Cilliers 2006:187 
11
   Meyerowitz et al 2008:66 
12
  Cilliers 2008a:109 
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- A comparison between section 245(4) of the Canadian Federal Income Tax 
Act and section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
- The application of section 245(4) of the Canadian Federal Income Tax Act 
and its effect on statutory interpretation in Canada. 
- The potential impact (if any) of section 80A(c)(ii) on statutory interpretation 
in South Africa. 
- Establishing on whom the burden of proof rests with regards to a misuse or 
abuse. 
- Examples illustrating the potential application (or not) of section 80A(c)(ii). 
 
1.3  Importance and value of the research 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) is crucial to the application of the general anti-avoidance 
rule (GAAR) since it applies ‘in any context’.  It is an alternative to the 
provisions of both section 80A(a), dealing with situations ‘in the context of 
business’ and section 80A(b), dealing with situations ‘in a context other than 
business’.  In relation to some of the other ‘tainted elements’, e.g. lack of 
commercial substance13, the requirements of section 80A(c)(ii) also appears 
rather undemanding.  It only requires that a provision is misused or abused.  
Cilliers is of similar opinion and indicates that section 80A(c)(ii) can be 
described as ‘the heart of section 80A’.14   
 
According to the economist Adam Smith in his book, Wealth of nations - 1776, 
one of the basic principles of any tax system should be that individuals can 
determine the amount of tax payable by them with certainty.15  In addition 
Cilliers notes that all taxpayers ‘are entitled to be placed in a position where 
they are able to reasonably ascertain, before committing to a certain 
transaction or course of action, ‘the exact area within which they will be 
trespassers’’.16  Because of the presumed ambiguous nature of section 
                                                 
13
  The requirements necessary to establish a lack of commercial substance are dealt with 
exhaustively and scattered through the rest of the GAAR, i.e. section 80C, 80D and 80E. 
14
  Cilliers 2008a:85-86 
15
  Smith 1973 
16
   Cilliers 2006:185 
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80A(c)(ii), certainty with regards to its meaning, application and effect is of 
cardinal importance.  Furthermore, the immense powers imparted to the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) when an arrangement is an 
impermissible avoidance arrangement aggravates this concern.17 
 
The proposed research will give more certainty to taxpayers and tax 
consultants18 in South Africa by providing them with a clearer picture as to 
how and when section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act may be applied.  As there is no 
indigenous litigation available with regards to this new provision, the research 
will also assist tax officers who are contemplating the application of section 
80A(c)(ii) to a proposed arrangement. 
 
1.4  Research design, methods and scope 
 
A non-empirical research method will be followed as the analysis of section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act can be done with reference to already published data.  
Data include literature and statutory laws (both foreign and local).    
 
In analyzing the origin, meaning, application and effect of section 80A(c)(ii) 
reference will to a great extent be made to existing practice statements and 
case law in Canada.  Judgments of the courts of other countries, although not 
binding on South African courts, are of significance because they have 
persuasive value.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
  See section 80B of the Act. 
18
  Kolitz (2007:45) states the following: ‘The provisions of the new GAAR present a challenge 
to both taxpayers and their advisers as they attempt to determine exactly how the new 
legislation should be interpreted and how it will apply.’  
19
  Clegg & Stretch 2007:2.4.1 
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1.5 Outline of the chapters 
 
1.5.1   History and evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act in South 
Africa 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the history and evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
in South Africa.  This is essential as the courts often refer to the legislative 
history of a provision when construing statutes.  
   
1.5.2   Examining the language of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
Chapter 3 analyzes the words contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act in 
order to determine their potential meaning and scope. 
 
1.5.3 Origin of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
Chapter 4 investigates into the origin of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  This 
exercise will establish a point of reference to which section 80A(c)(ii) can be 
compared in order to determine its possible application and effect in South 
Africa. 
 
1.5.4   A comparison between section 245(4) of the Canadian Act and 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
Chapter 5 performs an evaluation to identify and explicate the differences and 
similarities between section 245(4) of the Canadian Federal Income Tax Act 
(Canadian Act) and section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  This will give an indication of 
whether section 245(4) can be adopted as an appropriate comparative for 
section 80A(c)(ii). 
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1.5.5 The application of the misuse or abuse rule in the Canadian 
jurisprudence 
 
Chapter 6 examines Canadian case law relating to section 245(4) of the 
Canadian Act, the proposed root of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  The aim is to 
shed light on the application of the misuse or abuse rule in the Canadian 
jurisprudence.  This can give an indication of how the misuse or abuse rule, 
also contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, may be applied in South Africa. 
 
1.5.6 The effect of section 245(4) of the Canadian Act on statutory 
interpretation in Canada 
 
Chapter 7 will establish the approach to statutory interpretation in Canada 
both before and after the application of section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.  
This will reveal the effect of section 245(4) on statutory interpretation in 
Canada which will allow inferences to be drawn as to the possible effect of 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act on statutory interpretation in South Africa. 
 
1.5.7  The proposed effect of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act on statutory 
interpretation in South Africa 
 
Chapter 8 examines the approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa on 
a pre and post Constitutional level.  This chapter then evaluates whether the 
approach to statutory interpretation, as presumably required by section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act, will have any effect on the approach followed in South 
Africa.   
 
1.5.8   Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and the ‘spirit of the law’ 
 
Chapter 9 investigates whether section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act requires the court 
to have regard to the ‘spirit of the law’ when interpreting statutes.   
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1.5.9   Burden of proof with regards to section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
Chapter 10 will attempt to establish on whom the burden of proof rests with 
regards to a misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act, including the 
provisions of Part IIA.   
 
1.5.10  Examples 
 
Chapter 11 concludes the research with a few examples in order to confirm 
the contention raised with regards to the effect of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
on statutory interpretation in South Africa. 
 
1.5.11  Conclusion  
 
Chapter 12 provides a summary of the research as well as the author’s 
conclusion with regards to the stated objectives. 
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CHAPTER 2 
History and evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act in South Africa 
 
2.1  Introduction  
 
When interpreting statutory provisions, the courts often refer to the legislative 
history of the statutory provision.20  Amendments during the development of 
section 80A(c)(ii) can serve as an indication of its potential purpose and 
effect.  The evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) will therefore be analyzed from the 
initial recommendation in the Third Interim Report of the Commission of 
Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa, 1995 (the 
Katz Commission) through to its enactment in November 2006.21   
 
2.2  The Katz Commission 
 
The misuse or abuse concept was introduced in 1995 by the Katz 
Commission in its Report into Tax Reform.  The Katz Commission stated that:  
 
‘Concern has been expressed about the use of the business test as a 
basis for the normality requirement in that transactions, which, for 
example, utilize a tax incentive, granted by the legislation to encourage 
the very transaction in question, could be a victim of the provision.  This 
is an understandable concern and consideration could be given to a 
similar provision adopted by Canada, which has it that the anti-
avoidance provision is not to apply where it may reasonably be 
                                                 
20
  Solomon JA states the following in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 
530 at page 554: ‘It is true that owing to the elasticity which is inherent in language it is 
admissible for a court in construing a statute to have regard not only to the language of the 
Legislature, but also to its object and policy as gathered from a comparison of its several 
parts, as well as from the history of the law and from the circumstances applicable to its 
subject matter.’ (Emphasis added.)  The importance of the legislative history of a provision 
is also stressed by De Ville (2001:233). 
21
  The misuse or abuse concept will be indicated in bold when cited. 
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considered that the transaction would not result directly or indirectly in a 
misuse of the provisions of the Act or an abuse having regard to the 
provisions of the Act, read as a whole.’22 
 
With regards to the above concern, the Katz Commission recommended that 
the general anti-avoidance provision, contained in section 103(1) of the Act, 
should be remedied as follows: 
 
‘The provisions of section 103(1) must not apply where it may 
reasonably be considered that the transaction would not result directly 
or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of the Act or an abuse 
having regard to the provisions of the Act, read as a whole.’23 
 
This recommendation by the Katz Commission was however not adopted by 
the legislature when section 103(1) of the Act was amended in 1996.   
 
2.3  The draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
The misuse or abuse concept, although couched in seemingly different terms, 
made its re-appearance in 2005 in the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) of the 
Act, which read as follows: 
 
‘An avoidance arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement 
if its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit and …; or (c) in 
any context-…; or (ii) it would frustrate the purpose of any provision 
of this Act (including the provisions of this Part).’ 
 
 
 
                                                 
22
  Katz 1995:133 
23
  Katz 1995:133 
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Although the words ‘misuse’ or ‘abuse’ were substituted with ‘frustrate’, this 
change, it is submitted, did not bring about a significant effect.  This, as it will 
later also be revealed, is due to the terms ‘exploit’, ‘misuse’ and ‘frustrate’ in 
essence being synonyms to one another, with their sense most adequately 
captured by the word ‘frustrate’.24 
 
The recommendation of the Katz Commission, however, referred to a ‘misuse 
of the provisions of the Act or an abuse’ whereas the draft version of section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act only referred to ‘frustrate the purpose of any provision of 
this Act’.  The rationale behind the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) was 
apparently to discourage ‘impermissible avoidance arrangements that rely 
upon excessively literal or technical readings of the tax laws to defeat their 
purpose’.25  Reference to a misuse or abuse, however, ‘presupposes that 
there is some identifiable non-abusive use of each provision of the Act (and 
the Act as a whole), which can in some way be used as a yardstick against 
which to measure misuse or abuse.’26  Whereas the purpose of a provision is 
ascertainable and the ambit of such an inquiry within reasonable bounds, 
determining a yardstick against which to measure a misuse or abuse is a 
vague and seemingly incomprehensive inquiry27 i.e. abuse is in the eye of the 
beholder.28  It seems therefore that the inquiry under the proposal by the Katz 
Commission is a much wider one than that of the draft version of section 
80A(c)(ii).  
 
Using the word ‘wider’ in the above explanation portrays the idea that the Katz 
Commission proposed to enlarge the scope of section 103(1), by explicitly 
referring to the concept of a misuse or abuse.  However, as will be explained, 
it served the opposite purpose.   The recommendation by the Katz 
Commission is cast in negative language.  Its proposed purpose was to avoid 
                                                 
24
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SCC 54 at paragraph 49 
25
  South African Revenue Services 2006:16 
26
  Clegg 2007:37 
27
  An inquiry as to the misuse or abuse of a provision has been referred to by Cilliers 
(2008b:110) as an ‘invisible yardstick, a stealthful nocturnal assassin’. 
28
  Clegg 2007:36 
 15
transactions, ‘which, for example, utilize a tax incentive, granted by the 
legislation to encourage the very transaction in question,’ from falling victim to 
section 103(1).29  The recommendation by the Katz Commission was thus 
aimed at establishing an appropriate line of limitation on the operation of 
section 103(1).  By utilising the misuse or abuse concept (which seemingly is 
a very wide inquiry) the Katz Commission enhanced their recommendation’s 
capacity as a line of limitation.  See Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Proposed effect of the recommendation by the Katz 
Commission on the scope of section 103(1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
 
The positive language in which the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) is worded 
serves, it is submitted, an opposite purpose: the expansion of the operation of 
Part IIA.  By formulating the draft version in positive language, the provision 
was transformed from being a saving clause to a ‘tainted element’ which, if 
found to be present, could result in the application of Part IIA.30  However, by 
not employing the misuse or abuse concept, it is submitted, its expansion was 
kept within reasonable bounds i.e. ascertaining whether the purpose of the 
legislation has been frustrated is (seemingly) a much more confined inquiry 
                                                 
29
  Katz 1995:133 
30
  That which was originally intended to ‘save’ the taxpayer (by limiting Part IIA) was thus 
now turned against him (by expanding Part IIA). 
Scope 
of  
Scope of 
section 
103(1) 
Prior to the 
recommendation by 
the Katz Commission 
Effect sought after by the Katz Commission with their 
recommendation. 
section 
103(1) 
Negative language  
Vague concept of a 
misuse or abuse  
Scope 
of  
section 
103(1) 
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than ascertaining whether a provision has been misused or abused.  See 
Figure 2.2.  
 
Figure 2.2:  Proposed effect of the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) on 
the scope of Part IIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
2.4  The enacted section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii), as finally enacted, concludes in a different form to that of 
the draft version: 
 
‘An avoidance arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement 
if its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit and …; or (c) in 
any context-…; or (ii) it would result directly or indirectly in the 
misuse or abuse of the provisions of this Act (including the 
provisions of this Part).’ 
 
The enacted version of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act has a stronger 
resemblance to the recommendation by the Katz Commission than the draft 
version thereof.  However, the enacted version of section 80A(c)(ii), like the 
draft version, is couched in positive language, which furnishes an additional 
ground for the application of Part IIA, and thus expands the application 
thereof. 
 
The words ‘directly or indirectly’ did not appear in the draft version of section 
80A(c)(ii), but was inserted in the enacted version.  It is submitted that these 
Prior to the draft 
version of section 
80A(c)(ii) 
Subsequent to the draft version 
of section 80A(c)(ii) 
 
Scope of 
part IIA 
Scope of 
part IIA 
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words have been inserted to prevent unintended gaps in section 80A(c)(ii).  If 
these words have been omitted it would enable a taxpayer to argue that an 
indirect misuse or abuse of provisions will not be able to be targeted by 
section 80A(c)(ii).  This insertion, it is submitted, is an example of government 
increasing the complexity of tax laws to pre-empt possible avoidance from 
aggressive tax-planners.  The reason for this is that government suffers from 
the first mover disadvantage: it lays out rules, which are then analyzed and 
parsed by taxpayers.  Taxpayers have the advantage because government 
must ‘put their goods on show for all to see’.31  This amendment thus expands 
the scope of part IIA.  See Figure 2.3. 
 
Furthermore, the term ‘frustration’ in the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) was 
replaced by the term ‘misuse or abuse’ in the enacted version.  However, as 
mentioned earlier, the terms ‘exploit’, ‘misuse’ and ‘frustrate’ are in essence 
synonymous, with their sense most adequately captured by the word 
‘frustrate’.32  It is therefore submitted that this change in wording is of an 
immaterial nature.  
 
The draft version of section 80A(c)(ii), however, referred to ‘frustrate the 
purpose of any provision of this Act’ whereas the enacted version of section 
80(c)(ii) refers to ‘misuse or abuse of the provisions’.  This substitution, it is 
submitted, results in a significant expansion of Part IIA.  See Figure 2.3.  As 
explained earlier, it appears that establishing whether a misuse or abuse of a 
provision has occurred is a much wider inquiry than determining whether the 
purpose of a provision has been frustrated.  This, presumably, is due to the 
inquiry as to the purpose of a provision being a much more confined one than 
the inquiry as to some uncertain yardstick against which to measure a misuse 
or abuse. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
  South African Revenue Services 2005:11 
32
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada 2005 SCC 54 at paragraph 49 
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Figure 2.3:  Proposed effect of the enacted version of section 80A(c)(ii) 
on the scope of Part IIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5  Conclusion  
 
The misuse or abuse concept was introduced in 1995 by the Katz 
Commission.  It proposed that the concept be inserted as a saving clause, 
acting as an appropriate line of limitation on the operation of section 103(1).  
Its function was however reversed, it is submitted, in the draft version, as well 
as in the enacted version of section 80A(c)(ii): it expands the application of 
Part IIA.  This was accomplished by couching the provision in positive 
language (which furnishes an additional ground for the application of Part IIA) 
as opposed to negative language (which would have served as a salvage 
clause to the taxpayer from the application of Part IIA). 
 
A comparison between the draft version and enacted version of section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act revealed the following amendments:  
 
- The words ‘directly or indirectly’ were introduced into the enacted 
version.  It is submitted that these words were inserted to prevent any 
Draft version of section 
80A(c)(ii)  
 
Subsequent to the enacted version of section 80A(c)(ii) 
Prior to the enacted version of 
section 80A(c)(ii) 
Introduction of the 
words ‘directly or 
indirectly’  
Substitution of the phrase ‘frustrate the purpose 
of any provision’ with ‘misuse or abuse of the 
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Scope of 
part IIA 
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unintended gaps in section 80A(c)(ii).  It therefore expands the 
operation of section 80A(c)(ii) and thus the application of Part IIA. 
 
- The words ‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’ was replaced with 
the words ‘misuse or abuse of the provisions’.   In this chapter it was 
contented that reference to ‘misuse or abuse of the provisions’ 
expands the application of Part IIA beyond the boundaries presumed to 
be set under the reference ‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’.   
This contention implies that the concept of a misuse or abuse of a 
provision goes beyond that of merely frustrating the purpose of a 
provision.  The validity of this contention will be examined in 
subsequent chapters33 which will attempt at establishing the meaning, 
application and effect of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  
 
Having analyzed the evolution of section 80A(c)(ii) it is now necessary to 
ascertain the meaning of the language used in its enacted version.  This is the 
subject of chapter 3. 
 
                                                 
33
 See chapters 3 & 6 
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CHAPTER 3 
Examining the language of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
It is a firmly established rule of statutory construction that a meaning must be 
given to every word.34  The language of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act will 
therefore be examined to determine its meaning.  This exercise will also aid in 
determining the possible nature and scope of section 80A(c)(ii). 
 
3.2  It would result in 
 
The ordinary meaning of the word ‘result’ is as follows: 
 
‘Result ●v. occur or follow  (result in) have a specified end or 
outcome.’35 
 
The word ‘result’, therefore, refers to the ‘end or outcome’ of an arrangement.  
In Newton v COT36  Lord Denning stated the following at page 763: 
 
 ‘The word 'effect' means the end accomplished or achieved.’ 
 
The ‘end or outcome’ of an arrangement, it is submitted, can therefore be 
construed as the ‘effect’ of the arrangement.  This implies, it is submitted, that 
the word ‘result’ and the word ‘effect’ are in essence synonyms.  In Newton v 
COT37 Lord Denning indicated that the ‘effect’ of an arrangement must be 
determined objectively, irrespective of the motive of the parties.38  See Figure 
3.1. 
                                                 
34
  Emslie et al 1995:23   
35
  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 2002:997 
36
  Newton v COT [1958] 2 All ER 759  
37
  Newton v COT [1958] 2 All ER 759 at page 763 
38
  The word ‘effect’ is normally contrasted with the word ‘cause’ or ‘motive’ which has a 
subjective nature. 
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Therefore, it is submitted, the word ‘result’ lays down an objective standard.  
This contention implies that, in order for section 80A(c)(ii) to be applicable, the 
result of an avoidance arrangement must, objectively measured, be to misuse 
or abuse a provision of the Act. 
 
Figure 3.1: Construing the meaning of the word ‘result’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3  Directly or indirectly 
 
The ordinary meaning of the words ‘direct’, ‘directly’, and ‘indirectly’ are as 
follows: 
 
‘Direct ●adj. 3 without intervening factors or intermediaries.’39 
‘Directly ●adv. 1 in a direct manner.’40 
‘Indirect ●adj. 1 not direct.’41 
 
In SIR v Consolidated Citrus Estates Ltd42 the meaning of the word ‘directly’ 
was explained by Galgut JA at page 148 as follows: 
 
‘‘Directly’ appears to have been deliberately added in order to serve 
some purpose that the Legislature had in mind.  The purpose, I think, 
was to postulate that the connection between the taxpayer’s incurring 
                                                 
39
  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 2002:329 
40
  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 2002:329 
41
  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 2002:587 
42
  SIR v Consolidated Citrus Estates Ltd 1976 38 SATC 126 
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South African Concise Oxford Dictionary Newton v COT [1958] 2 All ER 759 
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the expenditure and the object for which it was incurred … should be 
direct, i.e. straight and close, not devious and remote.’ 
 
The words ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’ are antonyms.  By using them 
simultaneously the legislature has enhanced the reach of section 80A(c)(ii) of 
the Act. The word ‘directly’, it is submitted, means ‘straight and close’, 
whereas the word ‘indirectly’ means ‘devious and remote’.  The ‘straight and 
close’ or ‘devious and remote’ effect of the avoidance arrangement must 
therefore be to ‘misuse or abuse’ a provision of the Act. 
 
3.4   In the misuse or abuse  
 
The ordinary meaning of the words ‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’ are as follows: 
 
‘misuse ●v. 1 use wrongly. 2 treat badly or unfairly.’43  
‘abuse ●v. 1 use to bad effect or for a bad purpose.’44 
 
The ordinary meaning of the word ‘abuse’ has a strong resemblance to the 
language in which the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) was couched, i.e. 
‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’.  It seems therefore that ascertaining 
the purpose of a provision might be inherently imbedded in the linguistic 
nature of the word ‘abuse’.  This could imply that by substituting the phrase 
‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’ (in the draft version) with the phrase 
‘misuse or abuse of the provisions’ (in the enacted version) in fact not 
resulting in a broader inquiry under section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.45  The abuse 
of a provision seems to be synonymous with frustrating the purpose of a 
provision. 
 
                                                 
43
  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 2002:745 
44
  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 2002:5 
45
  In chapter 2 it was contended that the concept of a misuse or abuse of a provision goes 
beyond that of merely frustrating the purpose of a provision. 
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Cilliers indicates the following with regards to the meaning of the words 
‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’: 
 
‘It is also appropriate to point out here that it is doubtful whether ‘misuse’ 
and ‘abuse’ have materially different meanings.  Speculating about this 
is probably a fruitless exercise.  The two words mean roughly the same 
and, in the context of section 80A(c)(ii), can probably be regarded as 
synonymous.  In my view this is a case where one ought to disregard the 
presumption that each and every word in a statutory provision must be 
given an independent meaning and effect.  In using both the word 
‘misuse’ and the word ‘abuse’ the legislature probably merely acted ex 
abundanti cautela.  I surmise that it did not wish to denote two distinct 
concepts, but rather merely tried to ensure that the concept being 
expressed would be very clearly understood.  The courts will therefore 
probably interpret the phrase as denoting a singe, indivisible concept.’46 
 
Support for the above cited view is evident in the following statement by the 
court in Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada47: 
 
‘While the Explanatory Notes use the phrase ‘exploit, misuse or 
frustrate’, we understand these three terms to be synonymous, with 
their sense most adequately captured by the word ‘frustrate’.’ 
 
The words ‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’, it is submitted, are therefore synonyms.  
They imply utilising a provision ‘wrongly’ or for a ‘bad purpose’.  It seems 
therefore that the misuse or abuse inquiry involves establishing the purpose of 
a provision in order to ascertain whether such purpose has been contravened. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
  Cilliers 2008a:87 
47
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SCC 54 at paragraph 49 
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3.5  Of the provisions of this Act 
 
The phrase ‘of the provisions of this Act’ can be construed as follows: of the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, as amended.48  These 
words, together with the phrase ‘including the provisions of this Part’ outline 
the operative scope of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
 
3.6  Including the provisions of this Part 
 
‘This Part’ refers to Part IIA of the Act.  The concept of a misuse or abuse will 
therefore also apply to the provisions of Part IIA itself.  SARS states that it is 
inevitable that some will seek to parse the provisions of Part IIA to find 
unintended gaps or loopholes.49  In these circumstances the misuse or abuse 
requirement will serve to ensure that Part IIA is not misused or abused in 
ways that would frustrate its purpose in defeating impermissible tax avoidance 
and suppressing the mischief against which it is directed. 
 
3.7  Conclusion 
 
The words ‘it would result in’, it is submitted, yields an objective standard 
when determining whether an avoidance arrangement misuses or abuses the 
provisions of the Act (including Part IIA).  
 
The words ‘directly or indirectly’, it is submitted, implies that the connection 
between the avoidance arrangement and the misuse or abuse of the 
provisions of the Act (including Part IIA) may either be ‘straight and close’ or 
‘devious and remote’. 
 
                                                 
48
  See section 1 of the Act. 
49
  South African Revenue Services 2006:16 
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The words ‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’ roughly have the same meaning.  In essence, 
it is submitted, it means ‘exploiting’ or ‘frustrating’ the provisions of the Act 
(including Part IIA) which implies using such provisions ‘wrongly’ or for a ‘bad 
purpose’. 
 
Reference to the word ‘purpose’ in the above construction, it is submitted, 
may imply establishing the purpose of a provision in order to determine 
whether such purpose has been frustrated.  This could involve adopting a 
similar approach to that, presumably, required by the draft version of section 
80A(c)(ii).  If this argument is correct, it could refute the contention furnished 
in chapter 2, where it was indicated that the inquiry as to whether a provision 
has been misused or abused goes beyond that of merely ascertaining 
whether the purpose of a provision has been frustrated.  This issue will be 
addressed in a subsequent chapter50 which will attempt at establishing the 
possible effect and application of section 80A(c)(ii). 
 
The scope of section 80A(c)(ii), it was found, is limited to ‘the provisions of 
this Act (including the provisions of this Part)’.  This refers to the Income Tax 
Act No. 58 of 1962, as amended, and specifically includes Part IIA (which 
contains the GAAR) thereof. 
 
Having examined the language of section 80A(c)(ii) it is now necessary to 
ascertain its origin.  This is a crucial step in the analysis of section 80A(c)(ii) 
as it will provide an appropriate source from which inferences can be made as 
to its application and effect.  This is the subject matter of chapter 4. 
                                                 
50
  See chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Origin of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
Determining the origin of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act is a critical step in the 
analysis thereof.  This exercise will establish a point of reference to which 
section 80A(c)(ii) can be compared and from which its application can be 
explained.  It will also serve as a source in determining the possible effect of 
section 80A(c)(ii) on the South African jurisprudence and statutory 
interpretation.  The origin of section 80A(c)(ii) will thus form the foundation on 
which the subsequent analysis will be built.   
 
4.2  The opinion of several tax scholars in South Africa 
 
4.2.1   Mazansky 
 
‘It is a concept that has never been adopted in South Africa, though it is a 
fairly familiar concept in European jurisdictions and, latterly in Canada.’51 
 
4.2.2  Davis 
 
‘The misuse or abuse rule derives (in part at least) from the Canadian Federal 
Income Tax Act.’52 
 
4.2.3  Cilliers 
 
‘It seems that the changed wording has its roots in the Canadian GAAR and in 
the case law that has developed around it.’53 
 
                                                 
51
  Mazansky 2007:162 
52
  Davis et al 2007:80A-11 
53
  Cilliers 2008a:86 
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4.2.4  Clegg & Stretch 
 
‘The concept of ‘misuse or abuse’ of provisions finds its origin (apparently) in 
the provisions of the Canadian GAAR which uses a similar provision in 
conjunction with a bona fide purpose test.’54 
 
4.2.5  De Koker 
 
‘The ‘misuse or abuse’ doctrine is generally seen to emanate in tax law from 
the provisions of the Canadian GAAR, which employs a largely similar 
provision in conjunction with a bona fide purpose test.’55 
 
4.2.6 Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that section 80A(c)(ii) has its roots in Canadian and certain 
European jurisdictions.56  It is therefore necessary to examine the anti-
avoidance legislation in these jurisdictions in order to establish the origin of 
section 80A(c)(ii), which will then yield an appropriate point of reference. 
 
4.3  Canada 
 
The Canadian GAAR is contained in section 245 of the Canadian Act.  The 
misuse or abuse concept appears in section 245(4) thereof, which provides a 
basis for distinguishing between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax 
avoidance.57  This concept, upon its adoption in 1988, was also foreign to the 
Canadian jurisprudence.  According to the Explanatory Notes to Legislation 
Relating to Income Tax (Canadian Explanatory notes), accompanying the 
enactment of section 245, subsection (4) draws on the doctrine of ‘abuse of 
law’ which applies in some European jurisdictions.58 
                                                 
54
  Clegg & Stretch 2007:26.3.5 
55
  De Koker 2007:19.7 
56
  This is in accord with the Explanatory Memorandum (National Treasury 2006:63) 
57
  De Koker 2007:19.7 
58
  Wilson 1988 
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4.4  European jurisdictions 
 
A number of European jurisdictions apply the doctrine of ‘abuse of law’ to 
defeat schemes intended to abuse tax legislation.  The doctrine holds that 
abuse will occur when a taxpayer is not applying a statute according to its 
object and purpose i.e. circumventing the scope of a taxing rule, or unduly 
benefiting from an exemption provision.59   
 
France is an example of a European country applying the doctrine of ‘abuse 
of law’.  The French court applies this doctrine to ‘challenge instruments 
which, seeking the benefit of a literal application of the law to the detriment of 
the objective sought by their makers, could not have been motivated by any 
purpose other than that of escaping or reducing the tax liability which, but for 
these instruments, the interested party would normally have borne in light of 
its actual situation and activities.’60   
 
In essence the doctrine of ‘abuse of law’, it is submitted, is a matter of 
statutory interpretation: it requires a purposive approach to the construction of 
statutes in order to nullify schemes that frustrate the identified purpose. 
 
4.5  Conclusion  
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act derives (in part at least) from the Canadian GAAR 
contained in section 245 of the Canadian Act.  The Canadian GAAR uses a 
similar provision to section 80A(c)(ii) in subsection 245(4).  The misuse or 
abuse concept was however not developed in Canada.  It draws on the 
doctrine of ‘abuse of law’ which applies in some European jurisdictions, e.g. 
France. 
 
In the analysis of section 80A(c)(ii) reference will be confined to section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act.  A useful starting point will therefore be to 
                                                 
59
  Confederation Fiscale Europeenne 2007:4 
60
  Leclercq 2007:235 
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compare section 245(4) of the Canadian Act and section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  
This is done in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A comparison between section 245(4) of the Canadian Act  
and section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
From chapter 4 it appears that section 80A(c)(ii) originates from section 
245(4) of the  Canadian Act.  This presupposes some universal attribute 
between section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.      
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 245(4) of the Canadian Act will 
therefore be compared in order to establish the similarities and differences 
between them.  This exercise is essential as it will give an indication of 
whether section 245(4) can be adopted as an appropriate comparative for 
section 80A(c)(ii).  In addition, similarities will confirm the adoption of existing 
Canadian principles, whilst differences may indicate the contrary.   
 
Each of the subsequent sections will therefore commence by contrasting the 
language in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act with that of section 245(4) of the 
Canadian Act.  Differences and similarities in language will be indicated in 
bold. 
   
5.2  Similarities 
 
5.2.1  A misuse or abuse rule 
 
Table 5.1:  Comparison between section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act: a similar misuse or abuse rule 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act 
(c)  in any context – 
 
(ii) it would result directly or 
(4) For greater certainty, subsection 
245(2) does not apply to a 
transaction where it may 
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indirectly in the misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of 
this Act (including the 
provisions of this Part). 
 
reasonably be considered that 
the transaction would not result 
directly or indirectly in a 
misuse of the provisions of 
this Act or an abuse having 
regard to the provisions of this 
Act, other than this section, read 
as a whole. 
 
Both section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 245(4) of the Canadian Act 
contain a misuse or abuse rule.61  See Table 5.1.  This rule, in both sections, 
is couched in a similar format utilizing analogous terminology.  The misuse or 
abuse rule, in both section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 245(4) of the 
Canadian Act, it is submitted, forms the operative heart thereof.  This raises 
the presumption that the application of the misuse or abuse rule in section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act will be in conformity to its application in section 245(4) of 
the Canadian Act.  A related misuse or abuse rule thus strengthens the case 
for utilizing section 245(4) of the Canadian Act as a primary source in 
analyzing section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
 
In order to uphold this contention it must be determined whether any apparent 
linguistic differences between section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 245(4) 
of the Canadian Act can be of such a nature that it affects the application of 
the misuse or abuse rule in the respective sections.  The object is thus to 
establish whether the misuse or abuse rule will presumably be applied 
universally in the case of both sections 80A(c)(ii) and section 245(4) despite 
such differences.  If, subsequently, this is found not to be true, then it will be 
necessary to qualify the case for adopting section 245(4) as an appropriate 
comparative for section 80A(c)(ii). 
 
 
                                                 
61
  In Table 5.1 the words in bold indicate the misuse or abuse rule, as contained in the 
respective sections. 
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5.3  Differences 
 
5.3.1  Positive language as opposed to negative language  
 
Table 5.2:   Comparison between section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act: positive language and negative 
language 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act 
 
(c)  in any context – 
 
(ii) it would result directly or 
indirectly in the misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of 
this Act (including the 
provisions of this Part). 
 
 
(4) For greater certainty, subsection 
245(2) does not apply to a 
transaction where it may 
reasonably be considered that 
the transaction would not result 
directly or indirectly in a misuse 
of the provisions of this Act or an 
abuse having regard to the 
provisions of this Act, other than 
this section, read as a whole. 
 
 
Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act is cast in negative language.  See Table 
5.2.  It indicates that section 245(2)62 may not be applied when a transaction 
does not directly or indirectly result in a misuse or abuse.  The Canadian 
                                                 
62
  Subsection 245(2) of the Canadian Act serves as the deeming provision in section 245.  It 
requires that the tax benefit attached to an ‘avoidance transaction’ be nullified.  Section 
245(1) of the Canadian Act defines an ‘avoidance transaction’ as ‘any transaction that  ... 
would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the transaction may reasonably 
be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other 
than to obtain the tax benefit’.  This requirement, is broadly similar to that of the 
requirement contained in section 80A(b) of the Act.  In addition, section 245(1) of the 
Canadian Act defines a ‘transaction’ as including ‘an arrangement or event’, which is 
comparable to the definition of an ‘arrangement’ contained in section 80L of the Act. 
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Explanatory Notes state the following with regards to section 245(4) of the 
Canadian Act: 
 
‘… subsection 245(4) contains an important limitation to the application 
of section 245.  Even where a transaction results, directly or indirectly, in 
a tax benefit and has been carried out primarily for tax purposes, section 
245 will not apply if it may reasonably be considered that the transaction 
would not result directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of the 
Act or an abuse having regard to the provisions of the Act read as a 
whole.’63 
 
The Canadian Act, therefore, applies the misuse or abuse rule in section 
245(4), not as a requirement, but as an appropriate line of limitation on the 
operation of section 245.64  This prevents section 245 from being too broad 
and hitting transactions which the legislature could never have intended to 
attack.65  See Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: Proposed effect of section 245(4) on the scope of section 245 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act is cast in positive language.  See Table 5.2.  It 
indicates that an ‘avoidance arrangement’ will qualify as an ‘impermissible 
avoidance arrangement’ if it would result in a misuse or abuse of the 
provisions of the Act.  The function that the misuse or abuse rule plays in 
section 245(4) of the Canadian Act has therefore been reversed in section 
                                                 
63
  Wilson 1988 
64
  Olivier & Honiball 2008:405 
65
  Broomberg 2007:8  
Scope of 
section 
245 
Scope 
of  
section 
245 
Prior to  
section 245(4) 
Subsequent to 
section 245(4) 
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80A(c)(ii) of the Act.66  The misuse or abuse rule serves not as an appropriate 
line of limitation, but as an additional requirement to the operation of section 
80A.  It thereby expands the scope of Part IIA.  See Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Proposed effect of section 80A(c)(ii) on the scope of Part IIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By reversing the function which the misuse or abuse rule plays in section 245 
of the Canadian Act, the draftsmen have thus stripped Part IIA of any 
limitations and in so doing ignored the dangers of formulating a general anti-
avoidance measure too widely.67  This could result in a disturbance of the 
equilibrium between the power of the fiscus and a taxpayer conducting his 
business, and plunge Part IIA into a similar predicament than that in which its 
predecessor, section 103(1), was before the judgment in CIR v King68 when 
its ambit was considered to be too wide.  The Courts could, if it considers Part 
IIA’s ambit to be too wide, look negatively at it which could lead to a very 
narrow and restricted interpretation of the statute and frustrate the fiscus.69   
 
In addition, with regards to positive and negative language, the following was 
stated by Van Heerden J in Sayers v Khan70 at page 61:  
 
                                                 
66
  It would be remembered that the manner in which the rule is specified in section 80A(c)(ii) 
of the Act is also in contrast to the recommendation by the Katz Commission in 1995.  The 
Katz Commission favoured that the rule be cast in the negative. 
67
  Broomberg 2007:8   
68
  CIR v King 14 SATC 184 
69
  Louw 2007:40 
70
  Sayers v Khan [2002] 1 All SA 57 (C) 
 
Scope of 
part IIA 
Scope of 
part IIA 
Prior to 
section 80A(c)(ii)  
Subsequent to section 80A(c)(ii) 
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‘Other semantic guidelines which have crystallised in the South African 
case law are to the effect that, whereas the use of negative language 
has a peremptory connotation, the use of positive language suggests 
that the relevant statutory provision is directory.’ 
 
Negative language reduces the scope of a provision as it has a decisive 
nature.  Positive language, on the other hand, expands the scope of a 
provision as it has an indicative nature.  This confirms the contention that 
section 245(4) limits the scope of section 245, whereas section 80A(c)(ii) 
expands the scope of Part IIA. 
 
Although section 245(4) of the Canadian Act is cast in negative language and 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act in positive language, this does not alter the 
appropriateness of section 245(4) as a comparative for section 80A(c)(ii).  The 
difference in language only affects the scope of the respective anti-avoidance 
legislations, section 245 of the Canadian Act and Part IIA of the Act.  The 
application of the misuse or abuse rule, however, is not affected by this 
deviation: in the case of both section 245 and Part IIA it will have to be applied 
similarly. 
 
5.3.2  The flexibility of the courts when assessing for a misuse or abuse 
 
Table 5.3:  Comparison between section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act: judicial flexibility when 
considering a misuse or abuse 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act 
 
(c)  in any context – 
 
(ii) it would result directly or 
indirectly in the misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of 
 
(4) For greater certainty, subsection 
245(2) does not apply to a 
transaction where it may 
reasonably be considered that 
the transaction would not result 
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this Act (including the 
provisions of this Part). 
 
directly or indirectly in a misuse 
of the provisions of this Act or an 
abuse having regard to the 
provisions of this Act, other than 
this section, read as a whole. 
 
 
The phrase ‘may reasonably be considered that the transaction’ in section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act was omitted from section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  
See Table 5.3.  In Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada71 the court 
stated at paragraph 37: 
 
‘[Section 245(4)] is tempered by the word ‘reasonably’, suggesting some 
ministerial and judicial leeway in determining abuse.  It does not 
precisely define abuse or misuse.’   
 
It seems therefore that by omitting the phrase ‘may reasonably be considered 
that the transaction’ from section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, the legislature intended 
to restrict the ministerial and judicial flexibility in determining a misuse or 
abuse.  The word ‘reasonably’ in section 245(4) of the Canadian Act implies a 
‘fair and sensible consideration’72 of the provisions in question when 
evaluating them for a misuse or abuse.  It could be that the legislature, by 
omitting this phrase from section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, attempts to remind one 
of the established principle laid down in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC73: 
‘There is no equity about a tax.’  According to Emslie principles of equity are 
usually incapable of yielding an amount of tax that is fair.74 
 
The exclusion of the phrase ‘may reasonably be considered that the 
transaction’ in section 245(4) of the Canadian Act from section 80A(c)(ii) of 
                                                 
71
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 
72
  South African Concise Oxford Dictionary 2002:974 
73
  Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC (1921) 1 KB 64 at page 71 
74
  Emslie et al 1995:16 
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the Act, it is submitted, does not affect the appropriateness of utilising section 
245(4) as a comparative for section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.   Although this 
deviation could raise the presumption that the South African courts will apply 
the misuse or abuse rule more ‘severely’ than the Canadian courts, it is 
submitted, that the selected approach75 will not deviate significantly (if at all) 
from that followed in Canada. 
 
5.3.3  Considering the Act as a whole when establishing a misuse or 
abuse 
 
Table 5.4:  Comparison between section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act: considering the Act as a whole 
when assessing for a misuse or abuse 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act 
 
(c)  in any context – 
 
(ii) it would result directly or 
indirectly in the misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of 
this Act (including the 
provisions of this Part). 
 
 
(4) For greater certainty, subsection 
245(2) does not apply to a 
transaction where it may 
reasonably be considered that 
the transaction would not result 
directly or indirectly in a misuse 
of the provisions of this Act or an 
abuse having regard to the 
provisions of this Act, other 
than this section, read as a 
whole. 
 
 
Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act states that a misuse or abuse should be 
determined ‘having regard to the provisions of this Act … read as a whole.’  
                                                 
75
  More specifically: the courts attitude or sentiment when applying the misuse or abuse rule. 
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With regards to this phrase, the court, in Canada Trustco Mortgage Company 
v Canada76, stated the following at paragraph 51: 
 
‘This means that the specific provisions at issue must be interpreted in 
their legislative context, together with other related and relevant 
provisions, in light of the purposes that are promoted by those provisions 
and their statutory schemes.’ 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act do not contain the words ‘having regard to the Act 
... read as a whole’.  See Table 5.4.  Statutory interpretation, however, 
requires consideration of the context of the entire Act.  In City Deep Limited v 
Silicosis Board77 it was stated by Chief Justice Watermeyer, at page 702, that 
it is a well-known principle that –  
 
‘… a particular provision in a statute must be construed in the light of all 
the other provisions, or as it is often put in Latin ex visceribus actus.’ 
 
According to De Ville statutory interpretation is required to take place ‘from the 
bowels of the Act’.78  In other words, a statutory provision should not be 
construed on its own, but in the context of the entire Act.  The Court will 
therefore have to take the Act as a whole into consideration when the misuse 
or abuse rule is applied.   
 
Thus, although section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act does not specifically require that 
the misuse or abuse rule should be applied ‘having regard to the provisions of 
this Act … read as a whole’, this requirement is inherently imbedded in our 
approach to statutory interpretation.  This difference, it is submitted, will 
therefore not result in the application of the misuse or abuse rule, contained in 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, from being applied differently that that of its 
relative in section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.  The appropriateness of section 
                                                 
76
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SCC 54 
77
  City Deep Limited v. Silicosis Board 1950 (1) SA 696 (A)  
78
   De Ville 2001:142 
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245(4) of the Canadian Act as a comparative for section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act is 
thus not affected. 
 
5.3.4   Taking the respective anti-avoidance legislation into account 
when assessing for a misuse or abuse 
 
Table 5.5:  Comparison between section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act: considering the respective anti-
avoidance legislation when establishing a misuse or abuse 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act 
 
(c)  in any context – 
 
(ii) it would result directly or 
indirectly in the misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of 
this Act (including the 
provisions of this Part). 
 
 
(4) For greater certainty, subsection 
245(2) does not apply to a 
transaction where it may 
reasonably be considered that 
the transaction would not result 
directly or indirectly in a misuse 
of the provisions of this Act or an 
abuse having regard to the 
provisions of this Act, other than 
this section, read as a whole. 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act specifically requires a consideration of Part IIA 
when applying the misuse or abuse rule.  Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act 
specifically excludes considering section 245 when applying the misuse or 
abuse rule.79  See Table 5.5. 
                                                 
79
  A closer inspection of section 245(4) prompts the following question: does the phrase 
‘other than this section’ relate only to the ‘abuse’ part of the misuse or abuse rule, or does 
it relate to the entire misuse or abuse rule?  This inquiry is triggered by the repetition of the 
phrase ‘the provisions of this Act’ subsequent to the words ‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’, but the 
omission of the phrase ‘other than this section’ from the former word.  Chapter 6, however, 
will reveal that the misuse or abuse rule do not mandate two different inquiries, i.e. a 
misuse-inquiry and an abuse-inquiry.  It requires a single unified inquiry.  It is thus wrong, 
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The rationale behind the insertion of the phrase ‘including the provisions of 
this Part’ in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act was to ensure that Part IIA of the Act 
is not misused or abused.80  As an equivalent provision is absent from section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act, it seems therefore that section 245 is vulnerable 
to a misuse or abuse. 
 
This deviation, however, affects the scope of the misuse or abuse rule, not the 
application thereof: the misuse or abuse rule may be invoked against a 
misuse or abuse of Part IIA of the Act, but not of section 245 of the Canadian 
Act.  The misuse or abuse rule, it is submitted, will nevertheless be applied 
similarly in both jurisdictions, but its reach in South Africa is greater than that 
of it in Canada.  The appropriateness of section 245(4) as a comparative for 
section 80A(c)(ii) is thus left unaltered. 
 
5.4  Conclusion 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 245(4) of the Canadian Act share the 
fundamental characteristic that they both contain a misuse or abuse rule 
which is stated in similar language, using similar terminology. As it is 
supposed that the misuse or abuse rule forms the operative heart of the 
respective sections, it reinforces the case for applying section 245(4) of the 
Canadian Act as an appropriate comparative to section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
 
The following linguistic differences was however apparent between section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act and section 245(4) of the Canadian Act:  
 
- Section 245(4) is expressed in negative language, indicating that section 
245 will not apply where no misuse or abuse if found (thus limiting the 
                                                                                                                                            
so it is argued, to refer to a ‘misuse part’ or an ‘abuse part’ of the misuse or abuse rule.  In 
addition, chapter 3 confirmed (with reference to Canadian authority) that the words 
‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’ are synonymous.  It is therefore submitted that the phrase ‘other than 
this section’ relate tot the entire misuse or abuse rule. 
80
  South African Revenue Services 2006:16 
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scope of section 245).  Section 80A(c)(ii) is cast in positive language 
indicating that Part IIA will be applied when a misuse or abuse is 
established (thus expanding the scope of Part IIA). 
 
- The phrase ‘may reasonably be considered that the transaction’ appears 
in section 245(4) of the Canadian Act, but is absent from section 80A(c)(ii) 
of the Act.  This, it is submitted, may limit the judicial flexibility the South 
African court has when determining abuse. 
 
- Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act states that a misuse or abuse should 
be determined ‘having regard to the provisions of this Act … read as a 
whole.’  Although such a requirement is absent from section 80A(c)(ii) of 
the Act, it was established that it is inherently imbedded in our approach 
to statutory interpretation. 
 
- Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act specifically requires a consideration of Part 
IIA when applying the misuse or abuse rule.  Section 245(4) of the 
Canadian Act specifically excludes considering section 245 when applying 
the misuse or abuse rule.  The scope of the misuse or abuse rule thus 
differs between the two sections. 
 
The identified differences, it is submitted, do not alter the application of the 
misuse or abuse rule in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, from that of section 
245(4) of the Canadian Act.  This implies that the application of the misuse or 
abuse rule in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act is (presumably) in conformity with 
that required by the rule in section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.  Section 
245(4) is therefore, it is submitted, an appropriate comparative for section 
80A(c)(ii). 
 
The approach required by the application of the misuse or abuse rule in the 
Canadian jurisprudence, it is submitted, will presumably be required by 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  In order to make an inference as to the possible 
effect of section 80A(c)(ii) on the jurisprudence in South Africa, the Canadian 
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approach will have to be established.  This forms the issue addressed in 
chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
The application of the misuse or abuse rule in the Canadian 
jurisprudence 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
As previously noted, the concept of a misuse or abuse is a fairly familiar one 
in Canada81: section 245(4) of the Canadian Act contains a misuse or abuse 
rule that is similar to that contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  The words 
‘misuse’ and ‘abuse’ are, however, not defined in the Canadian Income Tax 
Act.82  In addition, the conjunction ‘or’ (in the phrase ‘misuse or abuse’) raises 
the question as to whether applying the misuse or abuse rule involves two 
different inquiries: a misuse inquiry and an abuse inquiry.      
 
The precise meaning of the words ‘misuse or abuse’ (in section 80A(c)(ii)) is 
also not apparent.  In chapter 2 it was contended that a 'misuse or abuse of 
the provisions’ (in the enacted version of section 80A(c)(ii)) may possibly be a 
much wider inquiry than ‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’ (in the draft 
version).  This, so it was argued, is due to the inquiry as to the purpose of a 
provision being a much more confined one than the inquiry as to some 
(presumably) uncertain yardstick against which to measure a misuse or 
abuse.  This contention, however, was refuted in chapter 3 were it was argued 
that establishing whether a provision has been used for a ‘bad purpose’ was 
inherently imbedded in the linguistic nature of the word ‘abuse’. 
 
In order to uphold the latter contention it is necessary to ascertain how the 
Canadian court establishes whether a misuse or abuse has occurred.  This 
will give an indication as to what constitutes a ‘misuse or abuse of the 
provisions’ and whether that deviates from ‘frustrate the purpose of any 
provision’.  An examination as to how the Canadian Court applies the misuse 
                                                 
81
  Mazansky et al 2006:4 
82
  Hogg et al 1999:509 
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or abuse rule (which is utilized in assessing for a misuse or abuse) is thus 
central to this inquiry. 
 
From the SARS’ Discussion Paper on Tax Avoidance and Section 103 of the 
Income Tax Act (Discussion Paper) it is clear that the interpretation of a 
‘misuse or abuse’ in Canadian case law is exactly what was intended by the 
South African legislature.83  This is also the contention raised in chapter 5: a 
similar misuse or abuse rule in both sections 245(4) of the Canadian Act and 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act presupposes a similar application thereof. 
 
OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen84 and Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v 
Canada85 is regarded as the pioneer decisions with regards to section 245(4) 
of the Canadian Act.  These two judgments will therefore be examined in 
order to explain the application of the misuse or abuse rule in the Canadian 
jurisprudence. 
 
This exercise will then give a possible indication of how the misuse or abuse 
rule (also contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act) will possibly be applied in 
South Africa.  It will also serve an additional purpose: it will enable inferences 
to be made as to: 
 
- whether the misuse or abuse rule mandates two different inquiries or not; 
and  
- the interpretation of the phrase ‘misuse or abuse’. 
 
6.2  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 
 
This is the first case in which the Federal Court of Appeal considered the 
application of section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.86 
                                                 
83
  Olivier & Honiball 2008:405 
84
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) 
85
  Canada Trustco Mortgage company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 
86
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) at paragraph 1 
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6.2.1  Application of the misuse or abuse rule 
 
The Federal Court outlined a two-stage analytical process to answer the 
question of whether there is ‘a misuse of the provisions of this Act or an abuse 
having regard to the provisions of this Act ... read as a whole’:87 
 
- The first stage involved identifying the policy  
 
- of the particular provisions of the Canadian Act that were relied upon 
to achieve the tax benefit; or 
- of the Canadian Act read as a whole. 
 
The term ‘policy’, it was held, refers collectively to the purpose, object, 
spirit or scheme of the provisions, or the Canadian Act as a whole.88   
 
- The second stage involved the assessment of the facts to determine 
whether the avoidance transaction constituted  
 
- a misuse of the identified policy of the particular provisions of the 
Canadian Act; or  
- an abuse of the identified policy of the Canadian Act read as a 
whole. 
 
The Court indicated that it is also necessary to bear in mind the context in 
which the misuse and abuse analysis is conducted.  It was held that the 
avoidance transaction may comply with the letter of the applicable provisions 
of the Canadian Act but nonetheless constitute a misuse or abuse thereof.89 
 
 
                                                 
87
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) at paragraph 59 & 67; see also 
Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 38 
88
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) at paragraph 66 
89
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) at paragraph 69 
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6.2.2  Misuse or abuse: two different inquiries? 
 
From the above it is apparent that the Federal Court prescribed two inquiries 
in assessing for a misuse or abuse.  See Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Assessing for a misuse or abuse (OSFC Holdings) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.3  Interpretation of the phrase ‘misuse or abuse’ 
 
The Federal Court did not construe the meaning of the words ‘misuse or 
abuse’.  It did however indicate that section 245(4) will be applied if the 
avoidance transaction misuses or abuses the ‘policy’ (object, spirit or 
purpose) of the particular provisions or the Canadian Act read as a whole.  
Determining the purpose (of the particular provisions or the Canadian Act as a 
whole) is thus central to the inquiry as to what constitutes a ‘misuse or abuse’.  
Such an inquiry is also fundamental to that prescribed by the draft version of 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act90 and presumably also the enacted version 
thereof91. 
                                                 
90
  The draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) contains the phrase ‘frustrate the purpose of any 
provision’. 
91
  In chapter 3 it was contented that an ‘abuse’ implies using a provision for a ‘bad purpose’. 
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6.3  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada  
 
This was the first decision in which the Supreme Court of Canada considered 
section 245 of the Canadian Act.92  This judgment is authoritative over that of 
OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen93, as the latter was made by the Federal 
Court of Appeal.  If the Supreme Court in Canada Trustco Mortgage Company 
v Canada94 therefore alters a principle or approach prescribed by the Federal 
Court of Appeal in OSFC Holdings v The Queen, the principle or approach 
required by the Supreme Court will prevail. 
 
6.3.1  Application of the misuse or abuse rule 
 
The Supreme Court agreed with, in principle, the two-stage analytical process 
outlined in OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen.95  This process, however, was 
amended to reflect a single inquiry in determining a misuse or abuse.  The 
amended process was elaborated as follows: 
 
- The first stage is to interpret the provisions, relied on by the taxpayer, 
giving rise to the tax benefit to determine their object, spirit and 
purpose.96  This requires the court to look beyond the mere text of the 
provisions and undertake a contextual and purposive approach to 
interpretation in order to find the meaning that harmonizes the wording, 
object, spirit and purpose of the provisions of the Canadian Act.97   
 
- The second stage is to determine whether the transaction frustrates or 
defeats the object, spirit or purpose of those provisions.98 
 
                                                 
92
  Duff 2006:54 
93
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) 
94
  Canada Trustco Mortgage company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 
95
  Canada Trustco Mortgage company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 40 
96
  Canada Trustco Mortgage company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 44 
97
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 47 
98
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 49 
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This process, it was argued, will lead to a finding of abusive tax avoidance 
when:  
 
-  a taxpayer relies on specific provisions of the Canadian Act in order to 
achieve an outcome that those provisions seek to prevent; or 
 
-  a transaction defeats the underlying rationale of the provisions that are 
relied upon; or 
 
-  an arrangement circumvents the application of certain provisions, such 
as specific anti-avoidance rules, in a manner that frustrates or defeats 
the object, spirit or purpose of those provisions.99 
 
By contrast, the Supreme Court indicated that an abuse is not established 
where an avoidance transaction was within the object, spirit or purpose of the 
provisions that confer the tax benefit.100  The court also held that section 245 
can only be applied to deny a tax benefit when the abusive nature of the 
transaction is clear.101  If the existence of abusive tax avoidance is unclear, 
the benefit of the doubt goes to the taxpayer.102 
 
6.3.2  Misuse or abuse: two different inquiries? 
 
The Supreme Court did not agree with the interpretation in OSFC Holdings 
Ltd v The Queen103 in that the words ‘a misuse of the provisions of this Act or 
an abuse having regard to the provisions of this Act ... read as a whole’ 
mandate two different inquiries.  That interpretation, the court stated, raises 
the impossible question of how one can abuse the Canadian Act as a whole 
without misusing any of its provisions.104 
                                                 
99
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 45 
100
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 45 
101
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 50 
102
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 66 
103
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen, 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) at paragraph 59 & 67 
104
  Canada Trustco Mortgage company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 39 
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The Supreme Court held that the determinations of a misuse and abuse are 
not separate inquiries.  It requires a single, unified approach to the textual, 
contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions of the 
Canadian Act that are relied upon by the taxpayer in order to determine 
whether there was abusive tax avoidance.105  See Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2: Assessing for a misuse or abuse (Canada Trustco) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.3  Interpretation of the phrase ‘misuse or abuse’ 
 
The Supreme Court indicated that the words ‘misuse or abuse’ imply 
‘frustrating’ or ‘defeating’ the purpose of the provisions relied on by the 
taxpayer.106  The contention furnished in chapter 3 is thus supported by the 
judgment in Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada.107  This could 
imply that the substitution of the phrase ‘frustrate the purpose of any 
provision’ (in the draft version) with the phrase ‘misuse or abuse of the 
provisions’ (in the enacted version) does in fact not result in a broader inquiry 
                                                 
105
  Canada Trustco Mortgage company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 43   
106
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 45 
107
  In chapter 3 it was contended that establishing whether the purpose of a provision has 
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under section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.   The abuse of a provision, therefore, 
seems to be synonymous with frustrating the purpose of a provision.108 
 
6.4  Conclusion 
 
A two stage analytical process was confirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada to elaborate on the application of the misuse or abuse rule, contained 
in section 245(4) of the Canadian Act:   
 
- The first stage is to interpret the provisions, relied on by the taxpayer, 
to determine their object, spirit and purpose.  This requires undertaking 
a contextual and purposive approach to interpretation in order to find 
the meaning that harmonizes the wording, object, spirit and purpose of 
the provisions.   
 
- The second stage is to determine whether the transaction frustrates or 
defeats the object, spirit or purpose of those provisions.   
 
It is submitted that this approach can also be used effectively in applying the 
misuse or abuse rule (contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act) in the South 
African jurisprudence. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada determined that the misuse or abuse rule do 
not mandate two different inquiries.  It requires a single, unified approach to 
the textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions 
of the Canadian Act that are relied upon by the taxpayer, in order to determine 
whether there was abusive tax avoidance. 
 
The investigation as to how the misuse or abuse rule is applied by the 
Canadian courts aided in explaining the meaning of the words ‘misuse or 
                                                 
108
  This, however, is contrary to the presumption that ‘where the legislature uses a different 
word or expression the strong inference is that this has been done designedly to provide 
for a different result’ (De Koker 2007:9.6). 
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abuse’.  It was established that these words can be construed as follows: 
frustrating or defeating the purpose of a provision.  This meaning has a great 
amount of resemblance to that of the words in which the draft version of 
section 80A(c)(ii) was cast.  If, therefore, the interpretation of a ‘misuse or 
abuse’ in Canadian case law is exactly what was intended by the South 
African legislature, this may imply that the substitution of the phrase ‘frustrate 
the purpose of any provision’ (in the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii)) with the 
phrase ‘misuse or abuse of the provisions’ (in the enacted version) does not 
have any significant effect. 
 
Although a potential approach to the application of the misuse or abuse rule 
(contained in section 80A(c)(ii)) has been identified, the following issue still 
remains to be addressed: what is the possible effect of section 80A(c)(ii) on 
the South African jurisprudence?  This issue will be addressed in two parts:  
chapter 7 will determine the effect that section 245(4) had on the Canadian 
jurisprudence as a preliminary to chapter 8, which will establish the possible 
effect section 80A(c)(ii) will have (if at all) on the South African jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The effect of section 245(4) of the Canadian Act on statutory 
interpretation in Canada 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The first stage to the application of the misuse or abuse rule (contained in 
section 245(4)) requires that the provisions relied on by the taxpayer be 
interpreted contextually and purposively.  Li and Picollo therefore made the 
following statement, with regards to the effect of section 245(4) on the 
approach to statutory interpretation in Canada: 
 
‘In a sense, the GAAR has the effect of being a general rule of statutory 
interpretation.  It would be difficult for judges to fall back on the strict 
interpretation or plain meaning with the GAAR in the Act.’109 
 
The approach to statutory interpretation in Canada will therefore be examined 
in order to determine the effect that section 245(4) had thereon.  This will 
serve as an indication of the possible effect that section 80A(c)(ii) may have 
on the approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa.  In order to aid the 
proposed exercise, it is necessary to briefly state the different approaches to 
statutory interpretation in common-law tradition.  This is a useful starting point 
as it forms the foundation on which the subsequent discussion will be based. 
 
7.2 The different approaches to statutory interpretation 
 
In common-law tradition there are two broad approaches to statutory 
interpretation: the traditional approach and the modern approach.110  Each of 
these approaches consists of two general theories to interpretation: literalism 
                                                 
109
  Li and Picollo 2007:43 
110
  SARS 2006:16 
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and intentionalism in the case of the traditional approach, and purposivism 
and contextualism in the case of the modern approach.111  These theories are 
not mutually exclusive of one another; in many cases their application is 
intertwined.  See Figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.1: The approaches to statutory interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2.1  The traditional approach 
 
The traditional approach to the interpretation of statutes holds that the literal 
meaning of the wording of a provision must be ascertained by the use of 
ordinary grammatical rules.  If the meaning of the words are clear then this 
meaning represents the intention of Parliament, the object of statutory 
interpretation always being to stamp a particular meaning with the 
Legislature’s iprimatur by means of the fiction of Parliamentary intent.112 
 
7.2.1.1  Literalism or Textualism 
 
According to literalism the true meaning of a statutory provision is to be 
sought virtually exclusively in the very words used by the legislature.113 
Adherence to the words of the provision must be given, regardless of  
                                                 
111
  Du Plessis 2002:93-98 
112
  Emslie 1995:16 
113
  Devenish 1992:26   
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manifestly unjust or even absurd consequences.114  This approach to 
statutory interpretation was described by Lord Cairns in Partington v The 
Attorney General115 at page 375: 
 
‘If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he 
must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial 
mind to be.  On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, 
cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, 
however apparently within the law the case might otherwise appear to 
be.’ 
 
7.2.1.2  Intentionalism 
 
Intentionalism (also referred to as the subjective theory) holds that the 
meaning of a statutory provision is governed by what the legislature intended 
as disclosed by the wording of the provision.116  This implies that the real 
intention of the legislature, once discerned, must be given effect to.117  The 
theory is based on the distinction between language on the one hand, and 
ideas and thought on the other.  It does not assume that the expressed 
intention is equivalent to the authentic intention of the legislature.118   
 
7.2.2  The modern approach 
 
Emslie holds the view that the traditional approach to the interpretation of 
statutes is at best a convenient fiction:  it is naïve to believe that statutes can 
be interpreted literally.  He states that linguistic philosophers such as 
Wittengenstein have pointed out that words, sentences and texts can never 
have meaning in themselves:  they are used in the context of a complex of 
tacitly understood rules, and it is only within this context that they have 
                                                 
114
  Joubert & Faris 2001:282 
115
  Partington v The Attorney General 21 LR 370 
116
  Kellaway 1995:63   
117
  Du Plessis 2002: 94 
118
  Devenish 1992:33 
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meaning.119  The modern approach attributes meaning to a statutory provision 
in the light of the purpose that it seeks to achieve by looking at it in context. 
 
7.2.2.1  Purposivism 
 
Purposivism attributes meaning to a statutory provision in the light of the 
purpose that it seeks to achieve.120  Legislative purpose is a more general and 
much more objective concept than that of legislative intent.121  This approach 
has been described by Lord Denning in James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Baco 
Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd122 at page 522-523: 
  
‘It means... that the Judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words 
or by the grammatical structure of the sentence.  They go by the design 
or purpose which lies behind it.’ 
 
7.2.2.2   Contextualism 
 
This theory is often advanced as the interpretive twin of purposivism123, the 
argument being that the purpose of a provision can only be ascertained by 
looking at it in context.124  The meaning of a provision is often said to be 
determinable by reading its words in context or reading the language in 
context or reading the provision itself in context.125  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
119
  Emslie 1995:16 
120
  Joubert & Faris 2001:285 
121
  Devenish 1992:35 
122
  James Buchanan & Co Ltd v Baco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd [1977] 1 All ER 518 
123
  I.e. contextualism and purposivism go hand in hand. 
124
  Du Plessis 2002:97 
125
  Joubert & Faris 2001:297 
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7.2.3  Conclusion 
 
There are two broad approaches to statutory interpretation: 
 
- The first is termed the traditional approach which demands the 
application of the literalism theory (adherence to the strict words of the 
legislation) and/or the intentionalism theory (adherence to the intention 
of the legislature).   
 
- The second is termed the modern approach which demands the 
application of the purposivism theory (adherence to the purpose of the 
legislation) and/or contextualism (adherence to the purpose of the 
legislation in context). 
 
7.3  The approach to statutory interpretation in Canada 
 
The approach to statutory interpretation in Canada will be evaluated 
(chronologically) in two parts.  The first part will determine the approach 
employed before the application of section 245(4).  The second part will 
determine the approach employed since the application of section 245(4).  
This will aid in isolating the effect that section 245(4) had on the Canadian 
courts approach to the interpretation of statutes. 
 
7.3.1  Pre application of section 245(4) 
 
7.3.1.1  Partington v The Attorney General 
 
Traditionally, Canadian courts interpreted tax statutes strictly (literally).126  The 
dictum of Lord Cairns in Partington v The Attorney General127 was accordingly 
adopted. 
 
                                                 
126
  Li & Picollo 2007:4 
127
  Partington v The Attorney General 21 LT 370 at page 375 
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7.3.1.2  Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen 
 
In the late 1970’s Canadian courts started to move away from the literal 
approach.  This move away from the literal approach gained momentum with 
the rise of the ‘modern rule’ to statutory interpretation.128  This rule was 
formulated in Stubart Investments Ltd v The Queen129 at page 578:  
 
‘Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an 
Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and 
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of 
the Act and the intention of Parliament.’  
 
The modern rule requires an examination of the meaning of the words used in 
the statute, the context of the provision within the statute, the scheme and 
object of the statute, and the legislative intent.   
 
7.3.1.3  Antosko v The Queen 
 
In the early 1990’s the modern rule continued to be cited, but its impact was 
reduced significantly by the court in Antosko v The Queen130 whom revived 
the literal approach to statutory interpretation.  The court stated at paragraph 
29: 
 
‘While it is true that the courts must view discrete sections of the 
Income Tax Act in light of the other provisions of the Act and of the 
purpose of the legislation, and that they must analyze a given 
transaction in the context of economic and commercial reality, such 
techniques cannot alter the result where the words of the statute are 
clear and plain and where the legal and practical effect of the 
transaction is undisputed...’ 
                                                 
128
  Li & Picollo 2007:4   
129
  Stubart Investments Ltd. v The Queen [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536 
130
  Antosko v The Queen [1994] 2 C.T.C. 25, 94 D.T.C 6314 (S.C.C) 
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7.3.1.4  Friesen v R 
 
In Friesen v R131 the court confirmed its move away from the modern 
approach when it stated at paragraph 17:  
 
‘When a provision is couched in specific language that admits of no 
doubt or ambiguity in its application to the facts, then the provision 
must be applied regardless of its object and purpose.  Only when the 
statutory language admits of some doubt or ambiguity in its application 
to the facts is it useful to resort to the object and purpose of the 
provision.’ 
 
The court in Friesen v R132 required the following approach to statutory 
interpretation: find the plain meaning of the statutory text first; only if that 
exercise fails in establishing an unambiguous interpretation may the court 
examine the object or purpose of the statutory provision.133 
 
7.3.1.5  Conclusion 
 
The approach to statutory interpretation employed by the Canadian courts, 
before the application of section 245(4), varied between the traditional 
approach and the modern approach, with the former prevailing in the mid 
1990’s.  This finding is summarized in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
131
  Friesen v. R [1995] 2 C.T.C 369, 95 D.T.C. 5551 (S.C.C) 
132
  Friesen v. R [1995] 2 C.T.C 369, 95 D.T.C. 5551 (S.C.C) 
133
  Li & Picollo 2007:6 
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Figure 7.2:  Approach to statutory interpretation in Canada before the 
application of section 245(4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.3.2  Post application of section 245(4) 
 
7.3.2.1  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 
 
OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen134 was the first case in which the court was 
able to analyze section 245 (the Canadian GAAR).  In applying this section, 
the court revived the application of the modern approach to statutory 
interpretation at paragraph 65:  
 
‘Determining whether a particular provision of the Act has been misused, 
or whether the Act read as a whole has been abused, requires an 
examination of the purpose (‘object and spirit’) of the particular provision 
or scheme of provisions.  It is not sufficient merely to rely on the 
technical language of the particular provision or scheme of provisions to 
determine whether there has been a misuse of the Act or an abuse of 
the Act read as a whole.’  
 
7.3.2.2  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 
 
In Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada135 the court conferred the 
modern approach to statutory interpretation at paragraph 10: 
                                                 
134
  OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen 2001 DTC 5471 (FCA) 
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‘It has been long established as a matter of statutory interpretation that 
the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the 
Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament: see 65302 
British Columbia Ltd. v. Canada, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 804, at para 50.  The 
interpretation of a statutory provision must be made according to a 
textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is 
harmonious with the Act as a whole.’ 
 
7.3.2.3  Mathew v Canada 
 
In Mathew v Canada136 the Court continued to apply the modern approach.  
The following was stated at paragraph 43 of the judgment:   
 
'While it is useful to consider the three elements of statutory 
interpretation separately to ensure each has received its due, they 
inevitably intertwine.  For example, statutory context involves 
consideration of the purposes and policy of the provisions examined. 
And while factors indicating legislative purpose are usefully examined 
individually, legislative purpose is at the same time the ultimate issue...’ 
 
7.3.2.4  Placer Dome Canada Ltd v Ontario 
 
Although the ‘modern rule’ of statutory interpretation was restated as the 
'textual, contextual and purposive' approach, it was unclear whether this 
approach would apply outside the GAAR context.137  In Placer Dome Canada 
Ltd v Ontario138 the court made it clear that the 'textual, contextual and 
purposive' approach was not confined to GAAR context, and applied to tax 
                                                 
136
  Mathew v Canada 2005 SCC 55 
137
  Li & Picollo 2007:12 
138
  Placer Dome Canada Ltd v Ontario (Minister of Finance) 2006 SCC 20 
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statutes in general.139  Li & Picollo comments that this came naturally as the 
GAAR is potentially applicable to many provisions of the Act and it would have 
been very odd to switch the interpretative approach depending on whether the 
GAAR is invoked or not.140  
 
7.3.2.5  Conclusion 
 
The Canadian courts, since the application of section 245(4), favoured a 
modern approach to the interpretation of statutes.  See Figure 7.3. 
 
Figure 7.3: Approach to statutory interpretation in Canada since the 
application of section 245(4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.4  Conclusion  
  
Section 245(4) of the Canadian Income Tax Act sparked a revival of the 
modern approach to statutory interpretation in Canada.  It persuaded the 
Canadian court to convert from interpreting statutes in a literal manner 
(traditional approach) to interpreting statutes in a unified textual, contextual 
and purposive manner (modern approach).  See Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4: Approach to statutory interpretation by the Canadian courts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Li and Picollo therefore notes that section 245(4) of the Canadian Act could, in 
a sense, be viewed as a statutory interpreting rule to codify the modern 
approach.141  The concept of a misuse or abuse of the provisions, it is 
submitted, is thus really a matter of statutory interpretation. 
 
Having determined the effect of section 245(4) of the Canadian Act on the 
jurisprudence in Canada, i.e. a move towards the modern approach to 
statutory interpretation, it is now necessary to examine the possible effect (if 
any) section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act may have on statutory interpretation in South 
Africa.  This is the issue addressed in chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The proposed effect of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act on statutory 
interpretation in South Africa 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 7 it was determined that a modern approach to statutory 
interpretation is central to the inquiry under section 245(4) of the Canadian 
Act.  It seems that such an approach to statutory interpretation was the SARS’ 
rationale142 behind the introduction of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act: 
 
‘Financial and commercial markets are becoming increasingly complex 
and the rate of change shows no sign of abating.  Throughout the world, 
tax laws have been forced to follow suit and have increased in both 
length and complexity in order to cope with this rapidly changing 
environment.  At times, the traditional “literal” approach to the 
interpretation of tax statutes has worsened the problem.  As a result, 
there has been a broad movement towards the so-called “modern” 
approach to the interpretation which requires a “contextual and 
purposive approach ... in order to find the meaning that harmonizes the 
wording, subject, spirit and purpose of the provisions of the [tax laws].” 
The proposed Element is intended to reinforce this emerging trend in 
South Africa.’143  
 
The above passage portrays the possibility that a traditional approach to 
statutory interpretation is followed in South Africa.  If this is the case, then, it is 
submitted, section 80A(c)(ii) will play a similar role to that of its Canadian 
counterpart (section 245(4) of the Canadian Act):  a move towards the 
                                                 
142
 The cited rationale relates to the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii).  This, however, is the 
only rationale furnished by SARS for section 80A(c)(ii). 
143
  SARS 2006:15 
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modern approach to statutory interpretation.144  If, however, a modern 
approach to statutory interpretation is already followed in South Africa, it is 
submitted, section 80A(c)(ii) will add nothing to our law, and can thus have no 
effect. 
 
This chapter aims at determining the approach to statutory interpretation in 
South Africa.  This is a crucial step in determining the possible effect (if at all) 
that section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act will have on the approach to statutory 
interpretation in South Africa.  A convenient starting point will be to examine 
the opinion of several tax scholars in South Africa. 
 
8.2  The opinion of several tax scholars in South Africa 
 
8.2.1  Broomberg 
 
According to this scholar the interpretation of tax laws in South Africa is 
anchored in a pure textual theory, as articulated by Rowlatt J in Cape Brandy  
Syndicate v IRC145.  He states the following:  
 
‘In other words, in South Africa, when the meaning of the words of the 
Income Tax Act is clear and unambiguous, the Court has to stop at the 
first step.  The application of a purposive interpretation is 
impermissible.’146 
 
Broomberg is thus of belief that a traditional approach to statutory 
interpretation must be followed in South Africa. 
 
 
                                                 
144
  Cilliers (2006:186), when commenting on the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii), states the 
following: ‘It is submitted that a provision like section 80A(c)(ii) would make sense, and 
might even be necessary, in a legal system where the prevailing method of interpretation 
is die-hard literalism.’ 
145
  Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC (1921) 1 KB 64 at page 71 
146
  Broomberg 2007:9 
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8.2.2  Clegg & Stretch 
 
These two scholars argue that the approach to the interpretation of statutes is 
encapsulated in the dictum of Lord Cairns in Partington v Attorney General147.  
They state the following: 
 
 ‘... if the wording of a provision is absolutely clear, it must be applied 
‘however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be’.  Only 
where there is ambiguity would a court look to the supposed intention of 
the legislature in a contextual sense, to interpret the provision.’148 
 
Clegg and Stretch is accordingly also of opinion that a traditional approach to 
statutory interpretation is followed.  
 
8.2.3  Louw 
 
This scholar shares a similar opinion to that of Broomberg: 
 
 ‘The so-called ‘textual, contextual and purposive’ method of 
interpretation stands in sharp contrast with South African jurisprudence, 
which mostly relates to the ‘textual’ meaning.  The dictum of Rowlatt J in 
Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC stating that ‘It simply means that in a 
taxing Act one has to look at what is clearly said.  There is no room for 
any intendment … One can only look fairly at the language used’ makes 
it clear…’149 
 
Louw is therefore also of view that a traditional approach to statutory 
interpretation is followed in South Africa.  
 
 
                                                 
147
  Partington v The Attorney General 21 LT 370 at page 375 
148
  Clegg & Stretch 2007:26.3.5 
149
  Louw 2007:40 
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8.2.4  Olivier & Honiball 
 
These two scholars show strong support for the approach to statutory 
interpretation prescribed in Venter v Rex150.  They state the following: 
 
‘… the purposive approach to interpretation of tax statutes is completely 
foreign to South African tax law.  The so-called ‘golden rule’ of 
interpretation which is followed in South Africa, is that the intention of the 
legislature is sought in the words used (the so-called ‘literal approach’).  
The only time this approach is deviated from is when the words used are 
not clear.’151 
 
Olivier and Honiball contend that a traditional approach to statutory 
interpretation is followed in South Africa. 
 
8.2.5  Conclusion  
 
Based on the opinion of the above mentioned tax scholars, it appears as if 
South Africa applies a traditional approach to statutory interpretation.  A 
comprehensive investigation will now be made into the approach of the South 
African courts to the interpretation of statutes.  The result will either support 
the stated contentions or contradict it.  
  
8.3   The approach to statutory interpretation in South-Africa 
 
The approach to statutory interpretation by the South African courts will be 
evaluated (chronologically) on a pre Constitutional and post Constitutional 
level.  The enactment of the Constitution in 1996, as will later be revealed, 
had far-reaching authoritative implications to statutory interpretation.  The 
rationale behind the proposed method of evaluation is to emphasise the 
                                                 
150
  Venter v Rex 1907 TC 910 at page 914 
151
  Olivier & Honiball 2008:405 
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practical effect (if any) the Constitution had on statutory interpretation in South 
Africa. 
 
It should be noted that the majority of cases analyzed for this evaluation do 
not relate to fiscal legislation.  Due allowance should however be given to the 
following dictum by Botha JA in Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v 
SIR152 at page 727:   
 
‘... there seems little reason why the interpretation of fiscal legislation 
should be subjected to special treatment which is not applicable in the 
interpretation of other legislation.’ 
 
8.3.1  The pre Constitution era 
 
8.3.1.1  Partington v The Attorney General 
 
The literal theory, articulated in the dictum of Lord Cairns in Partington v The 
Attorney General153, has been repeatedly referred to by the South African 
courts.  A traditional approach to statutory interpretation was thus applied. 
 
8.3.1.2  Venter v Rex 
 
Venter v Rex154 is regarded as the locus classicus insofar as the approach to 
interpretation of statutes by the courts in South Africa is concerned.155 The 
golden rule of statutory interpretation was formulated by Innes CJ at page 
914: 
 
                                                 
152
  Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 (A) 
153
  Partington v The Attorney General 21 LT 370 at page 375 
154
  Venter v Rex 1907 TC 910 
155
  De Ville 2000:51  
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‘.... when to give the plain words of the statute their ordinary meaning 
would lead to absurdity so glaring that it could never have been 
contemplated by the legislature or where it would lead to a result 
contrary to the intention of the legislature, as shown by the context or by 
such other considerations as the Court is justified in taking into account, 
the Court may depart from the ordinary effect of the words to the extent 
necessary to remove the absurdity and to give effect to the true intention 
of the legislature.’  
 
The golden rule to statutory interpretation is termed a literalism-cum-
intentionalism theory:  an alliance of the ordinary meaning of the words and 
the intention of the legislature.156  The rule requires adherence to the ‘plain 
words’ of a statute unless this would lead to an absurdity or to a result 
contrary to the intention of the legislature.  A court may in such instance 
depart from the literal meaning of a provision in an attempt to eliminate the 
absurdity or to give effect to the true intention of the legislature.157  Venter v 
Rex158 thus prescribed a traditional approach to statutory interpretation. 
 
This case, however, left an opportunity for a mode of statutory interpretation 
that takes proper account of the context in which a provision is set.159  The 
words –  
 
‘... as shown by the context or by such other considerations as the Court 
is justified in taking into account...’  
 
serves as authority for such an assertion.  This opportunity was only seized 
upon some decades later in the minority judgment of Jaga v Dönges, N.O160.  
 
                                                 
156
  Du Plessis 2001:107   
157
  Joubert & Faris 2001:290 
158
  Venter v Rex 1907 TC 910 
159
  Du Plessis 2002:108 
160
  Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at 
page 664 
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8.3.1.3  Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC 
 
A passage that has often been cited by the courts is the following dictum by 
Rowlatt J in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC161 at page 71: 
 
‘In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said.  There is 
no room for any intendment.  There is no equity about a tax.  There is no 
presumption as to a tax.  Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be 
implied.  One can only look fairly at the language used.’  
 
This implies that when the statute is expressed in clear, precise and 
unambiguous words, the court must give effect to the words only.162  This 
court thus required a traditional approach to statutory interpretation. 
 
8.3.1.4  CIR v Delfos 
 
Statutory interpretation received a flavour of intentionalism in CIR v Delfos163.  
After referring to the literal theory stated by Lord Cairns in Partington v 
Attorney General164, Botha JA went on to say at page 254: 
 
‘I do not understand this to mean that in no case in a taxing Act are we 
to give to a section a narrower or wider meaning than its apparent 
meaning, for in all cases of interpretation we must take the whole statute 
into consideration and so arrive at the true intention of the legislature.’ 
 
An approach to ascertain and apply the legislature’s intention when adhering 
to the words of a provision was thus required.  This judgment, it is submitted, 
draws on the literalism-cum-intentionalism theory prescribed in Venter v 
Rex165.  It thus applied a traditional approach to statutory interpretation. 
                                                 
161
  Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC (1921) 1 KB 64 
162
  Broomberg 2007:9   
163
  CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242 
164
  Partington v The Attorney General 21 LT 370 at page 375 
165
  Venter v Rex 1907 TC 910 at page 914 
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8.3.1.5  Jaga v Dönges, N.O 
 
The above mentioned opportunity in Venter v Rex166, i.e. applying a 
contextual theory, was not seized upon until the landmark minority judgement 
in Jaga v Dönges, N.O167.  Schreiner JA stated the following at page 662:   
 
‘Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the 
words and expressions used in a statute must be interpreted according 
to their ordinary meaning is the statement that they must be interpreted 
in the light of their context.’ 
 
Schreiner JA then went on and indicated that context refers not only to the 
language of the rest of the statute, but also to its matter, purpose, scope and 
background.  He stated at page 662: 
 
‘... ‘the context’, as here used, is not limited to the language of the rest of 
the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to 
be interpreted.  Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its 
apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its background.’   
 
Schreiner JA indicated that the relevance of context allows for two possible 
avenues of approach.168  The first avenue (qualified contextual approach) 
entails concentrating on the ‘clear ordinary meaning’ of the language and 
refers to the context only in instances where the language is ambiguous.  
According to the second avenue (unqualified contextual approach) context 
and language are taken together right from the start.169  He stated at page 
662 to 663: 
 
                                                 
166
  Venter v Rex 1907 TC 910 at page 914 
167
  Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 
168
  Joubert & Faris 2001:297   
169
  Devenish 1992:58 
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‘The second point is that the approach to the work of interpreting may be 
along either of two lines.  Either one may split the inquiry into two parts 
and concentrate, in the first instance, on finding out whether the 
language to be interpreted has or appears to have one clear ordinary 
meaning, confining a consideration of the context only to cases where 
the language appears to admit of more than one meaning; or one may 
from the beginning consider the context and the language to be 
interpreted together.’ 
 
According to Du Plessis, the following dictum by Schreiner JA (at page 664) 
intimates preference for the second avenue:170  
 
‘But the legitimate field of interpretation should not be restricted as a 
result of excessive peering at the language to be interpreted without 
sufficient attention to the contextual scene.’ 
 
The minority in Jaga v Dönges, N.O thus prescribed a modern approach to 
statutory interpretation.  As this was the opinion of the minority, it was not 
regarded as authoritative.  However, the view of Schreiner JA (as will be 
revealed) has met with success in several subsequent cases.  
 
8.3.1.6 Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) 
Ltd 
 
In the judgment by Wessels AJA in Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v 
Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd171 the words of Schreiner JA in Jaga v Donges 
N.O172 echoes in the background.  Wessels AJA required the court to strike a 
balance between context and language when reading a provision which 
requires interpretation.  He stated at page 476: 
                                                 
170
  Du Plessis 2002:114 
171
 Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation (SA) Ltd 1962 1 SA 458 (A) 
172
 Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at 
page 662 
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‘In my opinion it is the duty of the Court to read the section of the Act 
which requires interpretation sensibly, i.e. with due regard, on the one 
hand, to the meaning or meanings which permitted grammatical usage 
assigns to the words used in the section in question and, on the other 
hand, to the contextual scene, which involves consideration of the 
language of the rest of the statute as well as the ‘matter of the statute, its 
apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its background.’  In the 
ultimate result the Court strikes a proper balance between these various 
considerations and thereby ascertains the will of the Legislature and 
states its legal effect with reference to the facts of the particular case 
which is before it.’ 
 
The court thus required that the language be read in context i.e. in its setting.  
This implies the application of the modern approach to statutory interpretation. 
 
8.3.1.7  Rossouw v Sachs173 
 
In this case the Appellate Division required that the Court should examine the 
wording of a provision in its context and according to its purpose.  Ogilvie 
Thompson AJ stated the following at page 563 to 564:   
 
‘I accordingly conclude that in interpreting sec. 17 this Court should 
accord preference neither to the ‘strict construction’ ... nor to the 
‘strained construction’ ..., but that it should determine the meaning of the 
section upon an examination of its wording in the light of the 
circumstances whereunder it was enacted and of its general policy and 
object.’  
 
This court thus prescribed the combined application of both the contextual 
and purposive theory.  This implies the application of the modern approach to 
statutory interpretation. 
 
                                                 
173
 Rossouw v Sachs 1964 (2) SA 551 
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8.3.1.8  SIR v Sturrock Sugar Farm (Pty) Ltd174 
 
In delivering his judgment, Ogilvie Thompson AJ referred to the dictum by 
Schreiner JA in Jaga v Donges N.O175.   He then negated ambiguity as a 
requirement for the consideration of the context and purpose of a statutory 
provision.  He stated at page 903:   
 
‘Even where the language is unambiguous, the purpose of the Act and 
other wider contextual considerations may be invoked in aid of a proper 
construction.’ 
 
The court thus required the joint application of both the contextual and 
purposive theory.  The modern approach was thus sanctioned. 
 
8.3.1.9  SIR v Brey176 
 
Here Rumpff CJ required the court to look at the words, its context and its 
purpose when analyzing a statutory provision.  He stated at page 478: 
 
‘For purposes of ascertaining the meaning of words in a legal document 
like a contract, a will or a statute, a Court never looks at the words in 
stark isolation.  It looks at the words in their setting, at the context in 
which the words are used and at the purpose for which the words are 
intended.’ 
 
This court required the simultaneous application of both the contextual and 
purposive theory.  This entails applying a modern approach to statutory 
interpretation.  
 
                                                 
174
 SIR v Sturrock Sugar Farm (Pty) Ltd 1965 (1) SA 897 (A) 
175
 Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at 
page 664 
176
  SIR v Brey 1980 1 SA 472 (A) 
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8.3.1.10  UCT v Cape Bar Council177 
 
Upon delivering his judgment Rabie CJ gave sanction to an unqualified 
contextual approach in regard to the external aid of surrounding 
circumstances.178  After citing the dictum of Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges, 
N.O179 he stated the following at page 914: 
 
‘I am of the opinion that the words ..., clear and unambiguous as they 
may appear to be on the face thereof, should be read in the light of the 
subject-matter with which they are concerned, and that it is only when 
that is done that one can arrive at the true intention of the Legislature.’ 
 
Reading a provision in the light of its subject-matter implies adopting a 
purposive theory.  The modern approach to statutory interpretation was thus 
approved of. 
 
8.3.1.11  Conclusion 
 
The pre Constitutional approach to statutory interpretation in South Africa, it is 
submitted, evolved from a traditional approach (late 1800’s) to a modern 
approach (mid 1900’s).  This is illustrated by Figure 8.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
177
 University of Cape Town v Cape Bar Council 1986 (4) 903 
178
 Devenish 1992:59 
179
 Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at 
page 662-663 
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Figure 8.1: Approach to statutory interpretation in the pre Constitution 
era 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Without considering the effect of the Constitution, it seems therefore that a 
modern approach (as prescribed by the application of section 245(4) of the 
Canadian Act, and presumably therefore also section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act) 
was already authoritative in South Africa. 
 
8.3.2   The post Constitution era 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was promulgated in 1993 and 
enacted in 1996.  Section 1, 2 and 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996, indicates that the Constitution is superior to all other 
legislation.  With regards to constitutional and statutory interpretation section 
39(1) and (2) states the following: 
 
‘39. Interpretation of Bill of Rights.  
 
(1)  When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum –  
 
(a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom; 
(b)  must consider international law; and 
(c)   may consider foreign law. 
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(2)  When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’ 
 
Subsections (1) and (2) of section 39 of the Constitution, command a similar 
interpretative approach to both the Constitution and Statutes.  Constitutional 
interpretation thus, in effect, determines and shapes statutory 
interpretation.180  
 
According to De Ville the Constitution requires statutory interpretation to be 
established by following a broad contextual approach.  The context within 
which the statute is interpreted should include the constitutional values, the 
statute’s background, its purpose (viewed in the light of the aims of the 
Constitution), other statutes as well as the social, political and economic 
context and (where relevant) comparative and international law.181   
 
The Constitution, it is submitted, therefore provides a sovereign authority for 
the application of the modern approach to statutory interpretation.  
Nevertheless, case law following the enactment of the Constitution will be 
examined in an attempt to confirm the application of the modern approach.  
 
8.3.2.1  S v Makwanyane 
 
The judgment of Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges, N.O.182 has met with 
approval in constitutional jurisprudence.  In S v Makwanyane183 Chaskalson P 
stated at paragraph 10:  
 
‘I need say no more in this judgment than that section 11(2) of the 
Constitution must not be construed in isolation, but in its context, which 
                                                 
180
  Du Plessis 2002:133 
181
  De Ville 2000:62 
182
 Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at 
page 662-664  
183
 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 
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includes the history and background to the adoption of the Constitution, 
other provisions of the Constitution itself and, in particular, the provisions 
of Chapter 3 of which it is part.’ 
 
Reading a provision in its context implies adopting a contextual theory.  The 
Constitutional Court thus prescribed a modern approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
 
8.3.2.2  Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (In liquidation) v Van Deventer 
 
In Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (In liquidation) v Van Deventer184 the words of 
Schreiner JA in Jaga v Donges NO185 again emerges.  In his judgment, Hefer 
JA stated the following at page 726 to 727:  
 
‘But judicial interpretation cannot be undertaken... by ‘excessive peering 
at the language to be interpreted without sufficient attention to the 
contextual scene’.  The task of the interpreter is, after all to ascertain the 
meaning of a word or expression in the particular context of the statute in 
which it appears.’ 
 
Reference to the contextual scene of a provision implies adopting a modern 
approach to statutory interpretation. 
 
8.3.2.3  ABP 4x4 Motor Dealers (Pty) Ltd v IGI Insurance Co Ltd 
 
It has also been emphasised in ABP 4x4 Motor Dealers (Pty) Ltd v IGI 
Insurance Co Ltd186 that the context, including the purpose of a provision and 
the object of a statute as a whole, can show or furnish grounds for not reading 
a provision literally.187  Marais JA stated at paragraph 29: 
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 Fundstrust (Pty) Ltd (In liquidation) v Van Deventer 1997 (1) SA 710 (A) 
185
 Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at 
page 664 
186
 ABP 4x4 Motor Dealers (Pty) Ltd v IGI Insurance Co Ltd 1999 3 SA 924 (SCA) 
187
 Joubert & Faris 2000: 291 
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‘One is thrown back upon the ordinary meaning of the words used with 
due regard to their context, the apparent purpose of the provision in 
which they are found and, of course, to their setting in, and the object of, 
the statute as a whole.’ 
 
This court prescribed a contextual and purposive theory to statutory 
interpretation.  A modern approach to statutory interpretation was thus 
required. 
 
8.3.2.4  Minister of Land Affairs and Another v Slamdien and Others 
 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution seemingly prescribes a purposive theory for 
the interpretation of all statutes.188  In Minister of Land Affairs and Another v 
Slamdien and Others189 Dodson J stated at paragraph 13: 
 
‘Even though the law of statutory interpretation has not wholeheartedly 
adopted a purposive approach, it seems to me that where one is dealing 
with a statute which the Constitution specifically requires to be enacted 
in order to give content to the right concerned, it would be absurd to 
adopt a different approach to the statute’s interpretation.’ 
 
By prescribing a purposive theory to the interpretation of statutes the 
Constitutional Court thus, again, sanctioned a modern approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188
 De Ville 2000:249 
189
 Minister of Land Affairs and Another v Slamdien and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 413 (LCC) 
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8.3.2.5 Stopforth v Minister of Justice and Others; Veenendal v Minister 
of Justice and Others 
 
In Stopforth v Minister of Justice and Others; Veenendal v Minister of Justice 
and Others190, Olivier JA applied a purposive approach to the interpretation of 
statutes.  He confirmed the dictum by Ogilvie Thompson JA in SIR v Sturrock 
Sugar Farm (Pty) Ltd191.  Olivier JA then indicated that the golden rule 
formulated in Venter v Rex 1907192 by Innes CJ allows for such a purposive 
approach to statutory interpretation.  With regards to this approach he 
indicated at paragraph 21 that one should, at least –  
 
‘(i)   look at the preamble of the Act or at other express indications in the 
Act as to the object that has to be achieved; 
(ii)   study the various sections wherein the purpose may be found; 
(iii) look at what led to the enactment (not to show the meaning, but to 
show the mischief the enactment was intended to deal with); 
(iv)  draw logical inferences from the context of the enactment.’ 
 
Olivier JA required adherence to the purpose and the context of a provision 
when interpreting statutes.  He thus called for a modern approach to statutory 
interpretation.  
 
8.3.2.6  De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v CSARS 
 
In De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v CSARS193 Nienaber JA emphasised the 
cardinal importance of the context in which the words or phrases are used 
when interpreting fiscal legislation.  He held at paragraph 7: 
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 Stopforth v Minister of Justice and Others; Veenendal v Minister of Justice and Others 
2000 1 SA 113 (SCA) 
191
 SIR v Sturrock Sugar Farm (Pty) Ltd 1965 (1) SA 897 (A) at page 903 
192
  Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910 at page 914 
193
 De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for SARS [2002] 3 All SA 181 (A) 
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‘’Export’ in section 20(4) of the Customs Act must in my opinion take its 
colour, like a chameleon, from its setting and surrounds in the Act.’ 
 
Reading a provision in context or ‘from its setting and surrounds’ entails 
applying a modern approach to statutory interpretation. 
 
8.3.2.7  Standard General Insurance Company Ltd v CCE 
 
In Standard General Insurance Company Ltd v CCE194 Nugent and Lewis JJA 
referenced the dictum of Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges, N.O.195 and 
Nienaber JA in De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v CSARS196 as authority for their 
following statement at paragraph 25: 
 
‘Rather than attempting to draw inferences as to the drafter’s intention 
from an uncertain premise we have found greater assistance in reaching 
our conclusion from considering the extent to which the meaning that is 
given to the words achieves or defeats the apparent scope and purpose 
of the legislation. ... the word must ‘take its colour, like a chameleon, 
from its setting and surrounds in the Act’.’ 
 
Nugent and Lewis JJA investigate into the purpose of the legislation as 
opposed to the intention of the legislator.  This purpose is sought with 
reference to the context in which the provision is set.  A modern approach to 
statutory interpretation is thus applied. 
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 Standard General Insurance Company Ltd v Commissioner for Customs and Excise [2004] 
2 All SA 376 (SCA) 
195
 Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950(4) SA 653 at 
page 662 
196
 De Beers Marine (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for SARS [2002] 3 All SA 181 (A) at paragraph 
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8.3.2.8  CSARS v Airworld CC and another 
 
In CSARS v Airworld CC and another197 Hurt AJA favoured a purposive 
construction to fiscal legislation.  As authority for this view he cited the dictum 
of Nugent and Lewis JJA in Standard General Insurance Company Ltd v 
CCE198.  He stated at paragraph 25: 
 
‘Most of the rules of interpretation have been devised for the purpose of 
resolving apparent ambiguity and arriving at an interpretation which 
accord as well as possible both with the language which the Legislature 
has used and with the apparent intention with which the Legislature has 
enacted the relevant provision.  The interpreter must endeavour to arrive 
at an interpretation which gives effect to such purpose.  The purpose 
(which is usually clear or easily discernible) is used, in conjunction with 
the appropriate meaning of the language of the provision, as a guide in 
order to ascertain the legislator’s intention.’ 
 
Hurt AJA thus prescribed a modern approach to statutory interpretation. 
 
8.3.2.9  Conclusion 
 
The modern approach to statutory interpretation has continually been applied 
in the era succeeding the enactment of the Constitution.  This is illustrated by 
Figure 8.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
197
 CSARS v Airworld CC and another [2008] 2 All SA 593 (SCA) 
198
 Standard General Insurance Company Ltd v Commissioner for Customs and Excise [2004] 
2 All SA 376 (SCA) at paragraph 25 
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Figure 8.2:  Approach to statutory interpretation in the post Constitution 
era 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This finding, however, is only a continuation of the approach applied in the era 
immediately preceding the enactment of the Constitution.199  It seems 
therefore that the Constitution, in itself, did not have a significant effect on the 
approach to statutory interpretation, except for providing a sovereign authority 
for its application. 
 
8.4  Other considerations 
 
The modern approach to statutory interpretation, it is submitted, is also 
inherently embedded in our legislation: 
 
- The definition section of the Act (section 1) contains a proviso: ‘unless 
the context otherwise indicates’.  
 
Regard has therefore to be given to the context within which the word 
appears.  The definition section is thus, it is submitted, a codification of the 
modern approach. 
 
8.5  Conclusion 
 
The modern approach to statutory interpretation was already operative in the 
latter part of the era preceding the enactment of the Constitution, and 
continually applied since.  It seems therefore that the effect of section 245(4) 
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of the Canadian Act on the jurisprudence in Canada, i.e. a move from the 
traditional approach to the modern approach, will not be attainable by section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  If this was the effect sought after by its enactment, it is 
submitted that section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act will add nothing to our law. 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, it is submitted, will do no more than enshrine an 
approach to statutory interpretation that is already authoritative in South 
Africa.  It is therefore presumed that section 80A(c)(ii) will, at best, reinforce 
the case for applying a modern approach to statutory interpretation in South 
Africa.  Such an intention on the part of the legislator, it is submitted, is 
however redundant in the light of the Constitution which is regarded as a 
sovereign authority for applying the modern approach to statutory 
interpretation.  It is therefore submitted that section 80A(c)(ii) is no more than 
a reaction by the legislator to a perceived, but not real, unwillingness of the 
courts to look at the context and purpose of a provision.   
 
Although it is has been established that section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, 
apparently, requires an approach to statutory interpretation that is in 
conformity to that already followed in South Africa, there remains a 
presumption towards some ordained purpose for section 80A(c)(ii).  A closer 
inspection of the approach required by the Canadian court when applying 
section 245(4) of the Canadian Act, reveals a probable hint as to this 
speculated purpose.  In Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada200 the 
court prescribed a modern approach to statutory interpretation in order to ‘find 
the meaning that harmonizes the wording, object, spirit and purpose of the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act’.  The terms ‘object’, and ‘purpose’ are 
analogous to a modern approach to statutory interpretation.  Reference to the 
‘spirit’ of a provision, however, deviates from it.  Does this imply that the court 
must look for some spiritual meaning within a provision i.e. a thing apart of its 
language?  This is the issue addressed in chapter 9. 
                                                 
200
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 47 
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CHAPTER 9 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and the ‘spirit of the law’ 
 
9.1  Introduction 
 
Section 245(4) of the Canadian Act requires a modern approach to statutory 
interpretation.  Such an approach, it was established, is already present in 
South Africa.  When applying section 245(4), however, the Canadian court 
necessitates that the modern approach be applied in order to ‘find the 
meaning that harmonizes the wording, object, spirit and purpose of the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act.’201  Although the terms ‘object’ and 
‘purpose’ is not foreign to the modern approach, reference to the ‘spirit’ of the 
provision (in South Africa at least202) might possibly be.   
 
As it is presumed that section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act will require a similar 
approach to that required by section 245(4) of the Canadian Act, this could 
have far reaching (if not objectionable) implications to statutory interpretation 
in South Africa as it begs the following question: 
 
‘Is the provision [section 80A(c)(ii)] in fact an injunction to the court to 
look for some inner and spiritual meaning within the legislation that 
would not become apparent on a normal purposive approach?  Or is it 
merely a judicious reminder to the judiciary that in applying the law they 
must not forget to look for absurdity, ambiguity and purpose (as they 
already should, in any event)?’203 
 
It is therefore necessary to determine the Canadian position with regards to 
the ‘spirit’ of a provision and the proposed effect thereof on their approach to 
statutory interpretation.  The South African position will then be examined to 
                                                 
201
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 47 
202
 ‘The spirit of the law does not operate beyond the limits of its language.’ (Watermeyer JA 
in CCE v Randles Brothers and Hudson Ltd 33 SATC 48 at page 66). 
203
  Clegg 2007:37 
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establish exactly where our law stands in this regard.  The position in both 
jurisdictions will then be compared to identify any discrepancies.  
Discrepancies may reveal some rationale (or not) for the insertion of section 
80A(c)(ii) i.e. it may impute some operational function (or not) on section 
80A(c)(ii) with regards to statutory interpretation.204  The object in view is thus 
to determine if section 80A(c)(ii) in fact does contribute something to statutory 
interpretation in our law. 
 
9.2  Opinion of tax scholars in South Africa 
 
The plausibility of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act serving as a statutory authority 
that requires a court to look for some spiritual meaning within a provision, 
when interpreting statutes, will be evaluated.  For this purpose, the opinion of 
two tax scholars will be examined. 
  
9.2.1  De Koker 
 
An approach to statutory interpretation that involves adhering to the spirit of 
the law is opposed by De Koker: 
 
‘The principle is clear: at best, a contextual and purposive approach in 
order to find a meaning that harmonizes the object, spirit and purpose of 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act does not fit well into South African 
fiscal jurisprudence; at worst, the application of such an approach is 
impermissible.’205 
 
                                                 
204
 For instance, if it is found that section 245(4) requires the court to look for some spiritual 
meaning beyond that obtainable from a normal purposive theory to statutory interpretation, 
and it is found that such an approach is not operative in South Africa, this could imply that 
section 80A(c)(ii), as it is presumed that it requires an approach similar to that followed by 
the Canadian court when applying section 245(4), does in fact add something to statutory 
interpretation in South Africa. 
205
  De Koker 2007:19.7 
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De Koker is of opinion that such an ‘extension’ of the modern approach is not 
plausible in the South African jurisprudence.  
 
9.2.2  Cilliers  
 
An approach to statutory interpretation that engages in a search for the 
meaning of a provision beyond the limits of its language is strongly contested 
by Cilliers: 
 
‘Perhaps only the unfortunate reference to ‘spirit’ could be seen as 
problematic.  In our law it is dangerous, and in some sense even wrong, 
to speak of the ‘spirit’ behind a piece of legislation.  This is because the 
word is typically used to indicate something quite vague, something that 
is not synonymous with what might be called the purpose of a provision, 
but rather goes beyond it.  The objection to using the word ‘spirit’ in this 
sense is that it tends to make one forget that ‘the spirit of the law does 
not operate beyond the limits of its language...’. 206 
 
Cilliers is of view that an approach to statutory interpretation that seeks the 
‘spirit’ behind a provision is not plausible in South Africa.  
 
9.2.3  Conclusion  
 
According to De Koker and Cilliers ascertaining the ‘spirit’ of a provision does 
not fit well into the South African jurisprudence.  If section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
was to adopt such an approach it could be, so it is argued, potentially 
dangerous, if not impermissible. 
 
9.3  Spirit of the law 
 
The position of the Canadian courts with regard to the ‘spirit’ of a provision will 
be examined.  Attention is then shifted to the position in South Africa with 
                                                 
206
  Cilliers 2008b:108 
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regards to the ‘spirit of the law’.  The approach in both jurisdictions will then 
be compared in order to reveal any differences. 
 
9.3.1  The Canadian position 
 
The Canadian court indicated that there is no ‘overriding policy’ to be found in 
the Act, beyond that which can be discerned from its individual provisions, 
given a proper textual, contextual and purposive interpretation: 
 
‘The courts cannot search for an overriding policy of the Act that is not 
based on a unified, textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of 
the specific provisions in issue.’207  
 
Cilliers, when he analyzes the phrase ‘to find the meaning that harmonizes 
the wording, object, spirit and purpose of the provision’208, makes the 
following statement: 
 
‘However, this kind of impermissible reference to a so-called ‘spirit’ 
behind the legislation is apparently not what was intended in the above 
quotation, where, it seems, ‘spirit’ has no sinister meaning.  It seems that 
the word must simply be read eius dem generis with ‘object’ and 
‘purpose’.’209 
 
It is submitted, that the reference to the word ‘spirit’, as it appears in the cited 
dictum210, is synonymous with ‘object’ or ‘purpose’.  Authority for this view is 
also found in the judgment of OSFC Holdings Ltd v The Queen211, where the 
court stated the following at paragraph 66: 
                                                 
207
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 41-42 
208
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 47 
209
 Cilliers 2008b:108 
210
  ‘to find the meaning that harmonizes the wording, object, spirit and purpose of the  
provision’ 
211
 OSFC Holdings Ltd v R 2001 FCA 260 
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‘The approach to determine misuse or abuse has been variously 
described as purposive, object and spirit, scheme or policy.  I will refer to 
these terms collectively as policy of the provisions in question...’ 
 
By referring to the terms ‘purposive’, ‘object’, ‘spirit’ and ‘scheme’ collectively 
as ‘policy’ the impression is created that these terms may indeed be regarded 
as synonyms to one another, in the Canadian jurisprudence.   
 
9.3.2  The South African position 
 
A recognized principle in South Africa, with regards to the interpretation of 
statutes, is that the spirit of the law cannot operate beyond the limits of its 
language.  This principle was laid down by Innes CJ in Dadoo Ltd v 
Krugersdorp Municipal Council212 at page 544: 
 
‘There are expressions in these texts which lend some colour to the view 
that the spirit or intent of a law may be regarded as a thing apart from its 
language and capable, if infringed, of invalidating a transaction which, 
prior at any rate to Madrassa Anjuman Islamia v Johannesburg Council, 
has not been adopted by the South African Courts.  I know of no case in 
which the unexpressed intention of the lawgiver has been clothed with 
authority to affect a transaction which could not under ordinary rules of 
construction be brought within the written statute.’ 
 
This implies that a court cannot do violence to the language of the lawgiver by 
placing upon it a meaning of which it is not reasonably capable, in order to 
give effect to what it may think to be the policy or object of the particular 
measure.213 
 
 
                                                 
212
 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 
213
  Innes CJ in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at page 543 
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9.3.3  A comparison between the Canadian position and the South 
African position 
 
The position in South Africa and Canada, with regards to the ‘spirit’ of a 
provision in the context of statutory interpretation, will be compared in order to 
identify any discrepancies.  This will be accomplished by comparing the 
relevant section in Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada214 with that 
of its peer in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council215.  Both these 
cases are regarded as pioneers, in their respective jurisdictions, with regards 
to statutory interpretation. 
 
Table 9.1  Comparison between Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v 
Canada and Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 
 
Canada Trustco Mortgage 
Company v Canada 
Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council 
 
‘The courts cannot search for an 
overriding policy of the Act that is 
not based on a unified, textual, 
contextual and purposive 
interpretation of the specific 
provisions in issue.  First, such a 
search is incompatible with the role 
of reviewing judges.  The Income 
Tax Act is a compendium of 
highly detailed and often 
complex provisions.  To send 
the court on the search for some 
overarching policy and then to 
use such a policy to override the 
 
‘Now it has already been pointed 
out that in interpreting a statute a 
court is entitled to have regard not 
only to the words used by the 
Legislature but also to its object 
and policy.  But clearly more than 
that is embraced in these two 
leges.  Indeed, at first sight it 
would almost appear as if it 
were intended to lay down that 
a court may construe a statute 
so extensively as to declare 
invalid an act which, though it 
did not contravene the 
                                                 
214
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 
215
  Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 
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wording of the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act would 
inappropriately place the 
formulation of taxation policy in 
the hands of the judiciary, 
requiring judges to perform a 
task to which they are 
unaccustomed and for which 
they are not equipped...’216 
 
prohibition of the law, 
nevertheless did violence to its 
spirit and intent.  If that were the 
correct meaning of these two 
leges it would in effect enable a 
court of justice to legislate by 
supplying what is conceived to 
be omissions of the Legislature.  
Such an authority, however, has 
never, so far as I know, been 
claimed by the courts of this 
country …’217 
 
There seems to be harmony between the approach in Canada and South 
Africa with regards to the role of reviewing judges:  a judge has the role to 
interpret, not to legislate.  See Table 9.1.  It is thus impermissible in both 
jurisdictions for a judge to search for an ‘overriding policy’ (in the Canadian 
jurisdiction) or the ‘spirit’ (in the South African jurisdiction) of a provision when 
interpreting statutes. 
 
9.3.4  Conclusion 
  
The approach with regards to the ‘spirit of a law’ in South Africa, it is 
submitted, is in agreement with the approach followed in Canada with regards 
to an ‘overriding policy’.  Both jurisdictions do not allow the court to place a 
meaning on the language of a provision which it is not reasonably capable of 
bearing in order to give effect to a presumed policy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
216
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 41-42 
217
  Solomon JA in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at page 558 
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9.4  Conclusion 
 
In South Africa it is an established rule of statutory interpretation that the spirit 
of the law cannot operate beyond the limits of its language.  This canon is in 
accord with that followed in Canada where the court indicated that it is 
impermissible to search for an overriding policy of the provisions of the Act. 
 
Reference to the word ‘spirit’ by the court in Canada Trustco Mortgage 
Company v Canada218, it is submitted, must therefore be read eius dem 
generis with ‘object’ and ‘purpose’.  It therefore does not extend the modern 
approach to statutory interpretation which is required by the application of 
section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.   
 
This implies that section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, if the approach required by 
section 245(4) of the Canadian Act is adopted, will not require the court ‘to 
look for some inner and spiritual meaning within the legislation that would not 
become apparent on a normal purposive approach’ to statutory interpretation.  
Such an approach is in accord with that endorsed by both De Koker and 
Cilliers. 
 
An additional rationale for the insertion of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act could 
therefore not be identified in this chapter.  Section 80A(c)(ii) requires, it is 
submitted, a modern approach to statutory interpretation which was already 
authoritative prior to its enactment.  The conclusion reached in chapter 8 is 
thus still maintained: section 80A(c)(ii), presumably, does not contribute 
anything to our law. 
 
Although it was found that section 80A(c)(ii) would in all probability not add 
anything to our law, it is still a prerequisite for the application of the GAAR.  In 
order for section 80A(c)(ii) to be satisfied there must be proof of a ‘misuse or 
abuse’ of the provisions of the Act or Part IIA.  The next chapter will determine 
on whom the burden of proof lies with regards to abusive tax avoidance. 
                                                 
218
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 47 
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CHAPTER 10 
Burden of proof with regards to section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act 
 
10.1  Introduction  
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act fails to mention on whom the burden of proof lies 
with regards to abusive tax avoidance.219  This is a controversial issue in our 
law: 
 
- Section 82 of the Act places the onus on a taxpayer to show, inter alia, 
that any amount is not liable to tax.   
 
- In CIR v Conhage220, however, the court held that since section 82 dealt 
with the onus of proof in general terms, the special presumption in 
section 103(4) would have been redundant if section 82 was meant to 
apply to section 103 in general.221   
 
As section 103(1) has been abandoned, the authority of CIR v Conhage222, it 
is submitted, might be in jeopardy.  This chapter will therefore attempt to 
establish on whom the burden of proof rests with regards to a misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of the Act, including the provisions of Part IIA.  In 
answering this question the jurisdiction in Canada will be examined in 
combination with the opinion of tax scholars in South Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219
 I.e. does section 80A(c)(ii) place the burden of proof on the Commissioner (to convince the 
court that a provision has been misused or abused) or on the taxpayer (to confirm that a 
provision has not been misused or abused)? 
220
  CIR v Conhage Pty Ltd 61 SATC 391 
221
  Clegg & Stretch 2007:26.3.3 
222
  CIR v Conhage Pty Ltd 61 SATC 391 
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10.2  Approach in Canada 
 
In Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada223 consideration was given 
to the issue of burden of proof.  The court decided that once the taxpayer has 
shown compliance with the wording of a provision, it should not be required to 
disprove that he or she has thereby violated the object, spirit or purpose of the 
provision.  The practical burden of showing that there was abusive tax 
avoidance, it was held, lies on the Minister.  It is for him to identify the object, 
spirit or purpose of the provisions that are claimed to have been frustrated or 
defeated, when the provisions of the Act are interpreted in a textual, 
contextual and purposive manner.  The court justified this approach by stating 
that the Minister is in a better position than the taxpayer to make submissions 
on legislative intent with a view to interpreting the provisions harmoniously 
within the broader statutory scheme that is relevant to the transaction at issue. 
 
10.3  The opinion of various tax scholars in South Africa  
 
10.3.1  Meyerowitz 
 
When discussing the onus of proof, with regards to section 80A(c)(ii) of the 
Act, Meyerowitz makes the following statement: 
 
‘With respect it is also our view that although section 82 of our Act cast 
the onus upon the taxpayer to prove the assessment to be wrong he will 
have discharged this onus if the Court accepts that the requirements of 
section 80A (other than the misuse or abuse provisions) are not met, and 
it is then for the fiscus to convince the court that the taxpayer has 
misused or abused the relevant provisions.’224  
 
Meyerowitz thus favours that the burden of proof be placed on the 
Commissioner. 
                                                 
223
  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 65 and 69 
224
 Meyerowitz et al 2007:160 
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10.3.2  Cilliers 
 
With regards to the onus of proof, in the context of section 80A(c)(ii) of the 
Act, Cilliers makes the following statement: 
 
‘A tax-avoider’s goal is always primarily to secure an advantage for 
himself, even if his action should happen to be accompanied by an 
attitude of insouciance or one-upmanship towards the fiscus.  At any rate, 
it is submitted, the onus in this regard must rest on the fiscus.  To place 
the onus on the taxpayer in this context would be absurd.’225   
 
Cilliers accordingly supports the case for placing the burden of proof on the 
Commissioner. 
 
10.3.3  Davis 
 
After indicating that it was incumbent on the Commissioner to establish the 
facts upon which he had found ‘abnormality’ to exist in CIR v Conhage (Pty) 
Ltd226, Davis makes the following statement: 
 
‘On the basis of the Conhage case (supra) it would appear that the onus 
lies on the Commissioner to prove the abnormality, lack of commercial 
substance or misuse or abuse requirement, notwithstanding s 82.’227 
 
Davis holds the view that the burden of proof should be placed on the 
Commissioner. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
225
 Cilliers 2008b:104-105 
226
  CIR v Conhage Pty Ltd 61 SATC 391 
227
 Davis et al 2007:80G-1 
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10.4 Conclusion 
 
According to Meyerowitz, Cilliers and Davis the burden of proof with regards 
to section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act will rest on the shoulders of the Commissioner.  
This approach is in accord with that followed in the Canadian jurisprudence 
and similar to that established in CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd228.  It is therefore 
submitted that the practical burden of showing that there was a ‘misuse or 
abuse of the provisions of this Act (including the provisions of this Part)’ will 
be on the Commissioner, notwithstanding section 82 of the Act.   
 
In order to aid taxpayers, and even more so the Commissioner, whom it is 
alleged must establish a misuse or abuse, it is necessary to refer to some 
examples illustrating instances in which section 80A(c)(ii) may (presumably) 
be applied, and others where it may not be applied.  This will be illustrated in 
chapter 11. 
                                                 
228
 CIR v Conhage Pty Ltd 61 SATC 391 
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CHAPTER 11 
Examples 
 
11.1  Introduction 
 
In an attempt to understand the application of the misuse or abuse rule, which 
as it will be remembered, is contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and 
section 245(4) of the Canadian Act (its proposed root), it is necessary to 
furnish a few examples.  Two of these examples relate to recent Canadian 
cases: 
 
- Canada Trustee Mortgage Company v Canada229 in which an abuse was 
not established; and 
- Mathew v Canada230 in which an abuse was established. 
 
A further two examples231 will illustrate situations in which SARS proposes to 
apply section 80A(c)(ii): 
 
- Misuse or abuse of section 24J of the Act 
- Misuse or abuse of section 6quat of the Act 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
229
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 
230
 Mathew v Canada 2005 SCC 55 
231
 These examples relate to the draft version of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act, which contained 
the words ‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’.  The enacted version, however, refers to 
‘a misuse or abuse of the provisions’.  In 3.4 it was argued that the terms ‘misuse’, ‘abuse’ 
and ‘frustrate’ are synonyms.  It was also established that the linguistic nature of the word 
‘abuse’ requires determining whether the purpose of something has been violated.  The 
examples furnished by SARS, it is submitted, is thus still relevant for the enacted version 
of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
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11.2  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 
 
Facts 
 
Canada Trustco Mortgage Company (‘CTMC’), carries on business as a 
mortgage lender.  As part of its business operations, CTMC enjoyed large 
revenues from leased assets.  With the use of its own money and a loan of 
approximately $100 million from the Royal Bank of Canada, CTMC purchased 
trailers from Transamerica Leasing Inc. (‘TLI’) at the fair market value of $120 
million.  CTMC leased the trailers to Maple Assets Investments Limited 
(‘MAIL’) who in turn subleased them to TLI, the original owner.  TLI then 
prepaid all amounts due to MAIL under the sublease.  MAIL placed on deposit 
an amount equal to the loan for purposes of making the lease payments and a 
bond was pledged as security to guarantee a purchase option payment to 
CTMC at the end of the lease.  See Figure 11.1.   
 
Figure 11.1:  Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 
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These transactions allowed CTMC to offset revenue from its leased assets by 
claiming a considerable Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) on the trailers, whilst 
substantially minimizing its financial risk.232   
 
The appellant (Canada) submitted that the transaction involved no real risk 
and that CTMC thus did not actually spend $120 million to purchase the 
trailers from TLI.  In the appellant’s view, CTMC created a cost for CCA 
purposes that is an illusion without incurring any real expense.  This, the 
appellant argued, contravened the object and spirit of the CCA provisions and 
constituted abusive tax avoidance within section 245(4) of the Canadian 
Act.233 
 
Interpretation 
 
The court came to the conclusion that there was no abusive tax avoidance 
present under section 245(4) of the Canadian Act:   
 
‘The appellant suggests that the usual result of the CCA provisions of 
the Act should be overridden in the absence of real financial risk or 
‘economic cost’ in the transaction.  However, this suggestion distorts 
the purpose of the CCA provisions by reducing them to apply only 
when sums of money are at economic risk.  The applicable CCA 
provisions of the Act do not refer to economic risk.  They refer only to 
‘cost’. … We see nothing in the GAAR or the object of the CCA 
provisions that permits us to rewrite them to interpret ‘cost’ to mean 
‘amount economically at risk’ in the applicable provisions.  To do so 
would be to invite inconsistent results.’234 
 
                                                 
232
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 3 
233
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 69 
234
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 75 
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The court also noted that a narrow consideration of the ‘economic substance’ 
of the transaction, viewed in isolation from a textual, contextual and purposive 
interpretation of the CCA provisions, has very little meaning: 
 
‘… the application of the GAAR is a complex matter of statutory 
interpretation in which the object, spirit and purpose of the provisions 
giving rise to the tax benefit are assessed in light of the requirements 
and wording of the GAAR.  While the ‘economic substance’ of the 
transaction may be relevant at various stages of the analysis, this 
expression has little meaning in isolation from the proper interpretation 
of specific provisions of the Act.’235 
 
In essence the court applied a modern approach to statutory interpretation 
upon which it came to the conclusion that it would be wrong to confine the 
meaning of ‘cost’ to ‘amount economically at risk’.  Such an interpretation, the 
court stated would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the CCA 
provisions.   
 
The court also acknowledged the fact that the economic or commercial 
substance of a transaction is relevant in the misuse or abuse analysis, but 
warned that this characteristic, considered in isolation from the proper 
interpretation of the specific provisions of the Act, has little meaning.  The 
modern approach was thus held to be decisive. 
 
11.3  Mathew v Canada 
 
Facts 
 
The Standard Trust Company (STC) carried on a business which included the 
lending of money on the security of mortgages on real property.  STC became 
insolvent and a liquidator was appointed.  At that time STC owned a portfolio 
of 17 non-performing loans with 9 underlying real estate properties having a 
                                                 
235
 Canada Trustco Mortgage Company v Canada 2005 SSC 54 at paragraph 76 
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fair market value of approximately $33 million.  The cost to STC of the 
‘Portfolio Assets’ was approximately $85 million.236   
 
Since STC was being liquidated, it could not use the approximately $52 
million in unrealized losses from the Portfolio Assets.  The liquidator devised 
and oversaw the execution of a series of transactions to realize maximum 
returns on the disposal of the Portfolio Assets.  The overall arrangement 
involved three stages. 
 
- At the first stage, STC transferred a portfolio of mortgages with 
unrealized losses to a non-arm’s length partnership, Partnership A, 
thereby acquiring a 99 percent interest in it.   
 
- At the second stage, STC relied on section 18(13) of the Canadian Act 
to transfer the unrealized losses to Partnership A and then sold its 99 
percent interest in it to an arm’s length party, OSFC Holdings Ltd.   
 
- At the third stage, Partnership B was formed to acquire the 99 percent 
interest in Partnership A.  The appellant taxpayers then joined 
Partnership B and claimed their proportionate shares of the losses from 
the eventual sale or write-down of the mortgaged properties.237   
 
This scheme is illustrated by Figure 11.2.  Relying on a combination of section 
18(13) and the partnership provisions of the Canadian Act, the taxpayers 
deducted over $10 million of STC’s losses against their own incomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
236
  Mathew v Canada 2005 SCC 55 at paragraph 4 
237
  Mathew v Canada 2005 SCC 55 at paragraph 3 
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Figure 11.2:  Mathew v Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 18(13) of the Canadian Act reads as follows: 
 
‘Subject to subsection 138 and notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Act, where a taxpayer 
 
(a) who was a resident of Canada at any time in a taxation year 
and whose ordinary business during that year included the 
lending of money, or 
(b) who at any time in the year carried on a business of lending 
money in Canada 
 
Standard Trust Company (STC) 
- Business of lending money. 
- In liquidation. 
- Non-performing loans    $85m 
  Underlying securitized properties  ($33m) 
  Unrealized loss   $52m 
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partnership 
99% interest in Partnership A 
Transferred portfolio of mortgages with 
unrealized losses. 
Cash 
Relies on section 18(13) for the preservation of the loss. 
 
 
OSFC Holdings Ltd 
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99% interest in 
Partnership A 
Joins Partnership B Partnership B 
Arm’s length partnership 
Cash 

 
99% interest in 
Partnership A 
Appellants 
Claims their proportionate shares of the 
losses from the eventual sale or write-
down of the mortgaged properties. 
 
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has sustained a loss on a disposition of property used or held in 
that business that is a share, or a loan, bond, debenture, mortgage, 
note, agreement of sale or any other indebtedness, other than a 
property that is a capital property of the taxpayer, no amount shall be 
deducted in computing the income of the taxpayer from that business 
for the year in respect of the loss where 
 
(c) during the period commencing 30 days before and ending 30 
days after the disposition, the taxpayer or a person or 
partnership that does not deal at arm’s length with the 
taxpayer acquired or agreed to acquire the same or identical 
property (in this subsection referred to as the ‘substituted 
property’), and 
(d) at the end of the period described in paragraph (c), the taxpayer, 
person or partnership, as the case may be, owned or had a right 
to acquire the substituted property, and any such loss shall be 
added in computing the cost to the taxpayer, person or 
partnership, as the case may be, of the substituted property.’238 
 
The appellants, who ultimately claimed the losses, seeked to rely in part on 
the loss-preservation aspect of section 18(13)(d).  They argued that all the 
conditions under section 18(13) were met and that in particular, since 
Partnership A did not deal at arm’s length with STC at the end of the period 
prescribed, the unrealized losses were properly transferred to Partnership A.  
Further, so they argued, once the losses were preserved for the benefit of 
Partnership A under section 18(13), they were entitled to claim losses in 
proportion to their interest in Partnership B, under the partnership 
provisions.239 
 
 
 
                                                 
238
  The words in bold indicate the relevant provisions to the stated case. 
239
  Mathew v Canada 2005 SCC 55 at paragraph 39 
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Interpretation 
 
The court came to the conclusion that to use section 18(13), in combination 
with the partnership rules, in order to preserve and transfer a loss to be 
realized by a taxpayer who deals at arm’s length, results in abusive tax 
avoidance under section 245(4): 
 
‘Interpreted textually, contextually and purposively, s. 18(3) and s. 96 
[partnership provisions] do not permit arm’s length parties to purchase 
the tax losses preserved by s. 18(3) and claim them as their own.  The 
purpose of s. 18(13) is to transfer a loss to a non-arm’s length party in 
order to prevent a taxpayer who carries on a business of lending 
money from realizing a superficial loss.  The purpose for the broad 
treatment of loss sharing between partners is to promote an 
organizational structure that allows partners to carry on a business in 
common, in a non-arm’s length relationship.  Section 18(13) preserves 
and transfers a loss under the assumption that it will be realized by a 
taxpayer who does not deal at arm’s length with the transferor.  
Parliament could not have intended that the combined effect of the 
partnership rules and s. 18(13) would preserve and transfer a loss to 
be realized by a taxpayer who deals at arm’s length with the transferor.  
To use these provisions to preserve and sell an unrealized loss to an 
arm’s length party results in abusive tax avoidance under s. 245(4).  
Such transactions do not fall within the spirit and purpose of s. 18(13) 
and s. 96, properly construed.  The appellants’ submission that nothing 
in s. 18(13) limits subsequent dispositions of the property at arm’s 
length parties depends on a literal interpretation of the section and fails 
to address the main inquiry under the GAAR, which rests on a 
contextual and purposive interpretation of the provisions at issue.’240 
 
                                                 
240
  Mathew v Canada 2005 SCC 55 at paragraph 58-59 
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The court thus applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation and 
came to the conclusion that the transaction in question resulted in a misuse or 
abuse of the purpose which the provisions under dispute seek to achieve. 
 
11.4  Misuse or abuse of section 24J of the Act241 
 
Facts 
 
Section 24J provides for a synchronisation between the time when 
expenditure in the form of interest is incurred, for the purpose of determining 
the deduction allowable under section 11(a), and the time when that interest 
accrues to its recipient.242  It is applicable to an issuer in relation to an 
‘instrument’243 (as defined) and a holder in relation to an ‘income 
instrument’244 (as defined).   
 
Parties A and B, whom are both companies, intend to enter into a repurchase 
agreement in respect of certain securities.  A ‘repurchase agreement’ is 
defined as follows in section 24J(1): 
 
‘‘repurchase agreement’ means the obtaining of money (which money 
shall for the purposes of this section be deemed to have been so 
obtained by way of a loan) through the disposal of an asset by any 
person to any other person subject to an agreement in terms of which 
such person undertakes to acquire from such other person at a 
future date the asset so disposed of or any other asset issued by the 
issuer of, and which has been so issued subject to the same condition 
regarding term, interest rate and price as, the asset so disposed of;’245 
 
                                                 
241
  South African Revenue Services 2006:16-17 
242
  Meyerowitz 2007:13.40 
243
  Section 24J(2) 
244
  Section 24J(3) 
245
 The words in bold indicate the part that the taxpayers, in this example, contemplate in 
circumventing. 
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A ‘repurchase agreement’ satisfies both the definition of an ‘instrument’ and 
an ‘income instrument’ in the case of a company.  In order to avoid the 
provisions of section 24J, parties A and B substitute married put246 and call 
options247 for the portion of the agreement requiring the repurchase of the 
securities at the conclusion of the arrangement.  The strike price both for the 
put and the call is identical.   
 
The parties take the position that their arrangement falls outside the statutory 
definition of a repurchase agreement since the married put and call, taken 
literally, give them the right, but not the obligation, to repurchase the 
securities.  Section 24J is therefore not applicable. 
 
Since the strike price for the put and call in this example is the same, the 
arrangement ensures that one of the options will be executed and that the 
underlying securities will be reacquired by the original owner despite the 
absence of a technical legal obligation to do so.   
 
Interpretation 
 
SARS furnishes the following rationale for applying section 80A(c)(ii) in this 
example: 
 
‘Under the circumstances, if the parties’ position were to be accepted, 
the avoidance arrangement would frustrate the purpose of section 24J 
by permitting interest attributable to an instrument to be taxed on other 
than the yield to maturity basis.’ (Emphasis added.) 
 
The purpose of section 24J, so it is argued, is violated by the proposed 
transaction and therefore section 80A(c)(ii) may be applied.  A purposive 
                                                 
246
  A put option is the right to sell the underlying investment at a predetermined price up to or 
on a specific date (Goodall 2007:10.2). 
247
  A call option is the right to buy the underlying asset at a specific price up to or on a specific 
date (Goodall 2007:10.2). 
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theory to the interpretation of section 24J is thus implied.  SARS hence 
envisages a modern approach to statutory interpretation when applying 
section 80A(c)(ii).    
 
11.5  Misuse or abuse of section 6quat of the Act248 
 
Facts 
 
Company A is a South African company.  Company B is a foreign company, 
resident in country X, and is not subject to tax in South Africa.  Company B 
owns shares in another foreign company, Company C, that is resident in 
Country Y.  Country Y imposes a 15% withholding tax on dividends paid to 
foreign shareholders of resident companies.  The market value of the 
Company C shares is R1000 million.  On 1 October 2008 Company C 
declares a dividend of R100 million, payable to shareholders of record on 15 
October 2008. 
 
Promotor P approaches Company A with a pre-conceived plan.  Company A 
would enter into a repurchase arrangement with Company B in respect of the 
Company C equity shares.  Pursuant to this repurchase agreement, Company 
A would acquire 10% of the Company C shares for R100 million on 14 
October 2008.  It would then resell them to Company B on 18 October 2008 
for R100.1 million (R100 000 being equivalent to the interest foregone on 
R100 million for four days).  Company A would also agree to pay Company B 
a manufactured dividend249 on 15 October 2008 of R9.1 million.  Company A 
also pays Promotor P a fee of R200 000.  See Figure 11.3. 
                                                 
248
  South African Revenue Services 2006:17-18 
249
  Security lending arrangements normally provide that the borrower shall pay to the lender a 
‘manufactured dividend’ in stead of any dividends declared in respect of the security 
borrowed from the lender.  Any payment made by the borrower to the lender as a 
‘manufactured dividend’ is not a dividend for Income Tax purposes and must not be 
treated as a dividend by either the lender or the borrower.  The ‘manufactured dividend’ 
will constitute gross income in the hands of the lender and will not qualify for the 
exemption in terms of section 10(1)(k).  The person who is responsible for the payment of 
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Figure 11.3:  Misuse or abuse of section 6quat of the Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If this scheme is accepted, at face value, Company A would only report 
taxable income from the foreign dividend of R900 000.  It would also claim a 
foreign tax rebate of R1.5 million, equal to the full amount of the withholding 
tax imposed by country Y.  As a result of this approach, Company A would 
incur South African income tax of only R252 000, but would claim a foreign 
tax rebate of R1.5 million, thereby avoiding R1.248 million of South African 
income tax on other income: 
 
Foreign dividend received  R10 000 000 
Manufactured dividend ( R  9 100 000) 
Net dividend received  R      900 000 
Income tax @ 28%  R      252 000 
                                                                                                                                            
a ‘manufactured dividend’ will only be allowed a deduction in the determination of his 
taxable income of the amount paid, if the amount meets the requirements of section 11(a) 
of the Income Tax Act (Practice Note: No. 5 – 14 April 1999; Securities Lending 
Arrangements). 
 
Company A 
(RSA company) 
Company B 
(Foreign company + resident in country X + 
not subject to tax in RSA) 
Company C 
(Foreign company + resident in country Y + 
country Y imposes 15% withholding tax on 
dividends paid to foreign shareholders of 
resident companies) 
Owns shares in 
Company C 
Sell 10% of shareholding in Company 
C at R100m (market value) on 14 
October 2008. 
Resell 10% of shareholding in 
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 
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dividend on 15 October 2008 of R9.1m 
 
 to  = chronological steps of the scheme 
 
 
 
 119
Section 6quat rebate ( R   1 500 000) 
Income tax avoided   R   1 248 000 
 
In this arrangement, Company A suffers a negative cash flow and loss of 
R700 000 before South African tax.  After taking the South African income tax 
avoided into account this changes to a positive cash flow and profit of R548 
000. 
 
Profit on sale of shares  R     100 000 
Plus dividend received  R10 000 000 
Less foreign withholding tax ( R  1 500 000) 
Less manufactured dividend  ( R  9 100 000) 
Less fee paid to Promoter ( R     200 000) 
Negative cash flow before tax ( R     700 000) 
South African tax avoided  R  1 248 000  
Positive cash flow after tax  R    548 000 
 
Interpretation 
 
SARS provides the following reason for applying section 80A(c)(ii) in this 
example: 
 
‘The purpose of the foreign tax rebate under section 6quat is to provide 
relief from the double taxation of the same income.  In this scheme, 
Company A, Company B and Promoter P have attempted to manipulate 
the literal provisions of section 6quat to produce a result that would 
frustrate the purpose of those provisions.’ (Emphasis added.) 
 
Allowing the proposed scheme, so it is contended, would frustrate the 
purpose of section 6quat of the Act.  Reference to the ‘purpose’ of this 
provision requires a modern approach to statutory interpretation.  Here also, it 
seems that this is what SARS envisaged when enacting section 80A(c)(ii) of 
the Act.     
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11.6  Conclusion 
 
The examples confirmed the contention furnished in this study: the modern 
approach to statutory interpretation is presumably required when applying the 
misuse or abuse rule, which is contained in section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act and 
section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.
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CHAPTER 12 
Conclusion 
 
The misuse or abuse concept was introduced in 1995 by the Katz 
Commission.  It proposed that the concept be inserted as a saving clause, 
acting as an appropriate line of limitation on the operation of section 103(1).  
Its function, however, was reversed in the draft version, as well as in the 
enacted version of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act: it expands the application of 
Part IIA. 
 
The words ‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’ (in the draft version of 
section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act) was replaced with the words ‘misuse or abuse of 
the provisions’ (in the enacted version).  It was contented that the concept of a 
misuse or abuse of a provision goes beyond that of merely frustrating the 
purpose of a provision. This was due to the former, so it was argued, being a 
much more vague and incomprehensive inquiry than the latter.  However, 
when the ordinary meaning of the word ‘abuse’ was construed, it seemed that 
ascertaining whether the purpose of something was contravened was 
inherently imbedded in its linguistic nature.  An inquiry as to the abuse of a 
provision, so it was argued, could therefore not go beyond that of frustrating 
the purpose of a provision.   
 
The latter contention was confirmed when it was established that the words 
‘misuse or abuse’, in Canadian case law, imply ‘frustrating’ or ‘defeating’ the 
purpose of a provision i.e. using a provision for a bad purpose.  If therefore, 
the interpretation of a ‘misuse or abuse’ in Canadian case law is exactly what 
was intended by the South African legislature this may imply that the 
substitution of the phrase ‘frustrate the purpose of any provision’ (in the draft 
version of section 80A(c)(ii)) with the phrase ‘misuse or abuse of the 
provisions’ (in the enacted version) does not have any significant effect.  This, 
however, is contrary to the presumption that where the legislature uses a 
different word or expression the strong inference is that this has been done 
designedly to provide for a different result.  The precise meaning of the words 
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‘misuse or abuse’ is thus still elusive.  This confirms the contention that 
section 80A(c)(ii) is an ambiguous provision. 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act requires an objective evaluation.  This is yielded 
by the words ‘it would result in’.  By employing the words ‘directly or indirectly’ 
the legislature captures both the situations where the connection between an 
avoidance arrangement and the misuse or abuse of a provision is direct and 
remote.  The application of section 80A(c)(ii) is limited to the provisions of the 
Act, which includes Part IIA. 
 
Section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act derives (in part at least) from the Canadian GAAR 
contained in section 245 of the Canadian Act.  The misuse or abuse concept, 
contained in section 245(4) thereof, however, draws on the doctrine of ‘abuse 
of law’ which applies in some European jurisdictions.  The research was 
however confined to section 245(4) of the Canadian Act.   
 
A comparison between section 245(4) of the Canadian Act and section 
80A(c)(ii) of the Act revealed a fundamental similarity: both sections contain a 
misuse or abuse rule, expressed in similar language and set-up, which forms 
the operative heart thereof.  Section 245(4), however, employs the misuse or 
abuse rule as a line of limitation to section 245 (as it is couched in negative 
language), whereas section 80A(c)(ii) employs it as an expansion to Part IIA 
(as it is couched in positive language).  Other differences between the two 
provisions relate to the scope of the misuse or abuse rule and the judicial 
flexibility the court has when applying it.  None of the differences, it was 
submitted, rendered the presumable application of the misuse or abuse rule, 
in their respective sections, different from the other.  It was therefore argued 
that section 245(4) of the Canadian Act could be regarded as an appropriate 
comparative for section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act. 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the application of the misuse or 
abuse rule involves a two-stage analytical process:   
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- The first stage is to interpret the provisions, relied on by the taxpayer, 
to determine their object, spirit and purpose.  This requires undertaking 
a contextual and purposive theory to statutory interpretation. 
  
- The second stage is to determine whether the transaction frustrates the 
identified object, spirit or purpose of those provisions.   
 
Section 245(4) thus obliged the Canadian court to convert from interpreting 
statutes in a literal manner (the traditional approach) to interpreting statutes in 
a contextual and purposive manner (the modern approach).  Section 245(4), 
therefore, had the effect of being a statutory interpreting rule in Canada to 
codify the modern approach. 
 
In South Africa, however, the modern approach to statutory interpretation was 
already operative prior to the enactment of section 80A(c)(ii) of the Act.  If, 
therefore, the effect sought after by our legislator when enacting this section, 
was to encourage a modern approach to statutory interpretation (like that of 
its counterpart in Canada) section 80A(c)(ii) will add nothing to our law.  It will 
merely enshrine an approach to statutory interpretation that is already 
authoritative in South Africa.   
 
Reference to the ‘spirit’ of a provision (in the two-stage analytical process 
applied by the Supreme Court of Canada) requires not that the court must 
search for some ‘overriding policy’ of a provision i.e. some inner and spiritual 
meaning within the legislation that would not become apparent on the 
application of the modern approach.  The South African and Canadian 
position are thus in accord to one another. 
 
The practical burden of showing that there was abusive tax avoidance, it is 
proposed, lies on the Commissioner (notwithstanding section 82 of the Act).  
This approach is in agreement to that followed in the Canadian jurisprudence. 
 
The examples furnished in this research confirmed the conclusion to which 
the writer has come: section 80A(c)(ii) presumably adds nothing to our law, it 
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merely requires a modern approach to statutory interpretation which has been 
applied of old by the South African Courts.   
 
As formerly required, taxpayers and tax consultants, when utilizing the 
provisions of the Act, should adhere to a modern approach when construing 
those provisions.  Similarly, tax officers, when contemplating the application of 
section 80A(c)(ii), is obliged to base allegations on a modern approach to 
statutory interpretation. 
 
It seems therefore that the architects of tax aggressive structures have thus 
never been permitted to abuse South Africa’s tax provisions in ways clearly 
unintended by the legislation.  They have since the mid 1900’s, so it appears, 
been vigorously challenged by the modern approach to statutory 
interpretation. 
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